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This thesis focuses on the regional response to the crisis in Colombia.  The major 
conclusions of the thesis are that the crisis directly affects the security of Colombia’s 
neighbors; that the use of military force will be the most important element in a strategy 
to restore security and that the Colombian military will require external military 
assistance to do so; that while Colombia’s neighbors have traditionally rejected ideas of 
intervention, there are indications that they may be willing to participate in such an 
endeavor; and that while less politically risky courses of action are more likely to occur, a 
regional military force operating in a peacemaking role will be the most effective course 
of action towards restoring security in Colombia and the region.  These conclusions are 
reached through an examination of the conflict’s effect on Colombia and its neighbors, 
the capabilities of the Colombian security forces, the history of regional cooperative 
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Violence and instability have dominated the political and security scene within 
Colombia for many years.  This complex internal war involving guerrilla groups, 
narcotics traffickers and paramilitary groups has intensified since the mid 1990s and 
presented an increasingly lethal threat to democracy in Colombia.  In an effort to restore 
security and ensure democracy in the country, Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, 
has moved aggressively to take efforts to end the violence and restore some semblance of 
security in his country.  He is committed to restore the state’s authority and increase 
government presence throughout the country.  Abandoning the unsuccessful efforts of 
past presidents to negotiate with the insurgents, the Uribe government is committed to 
strengthening the capacity of the armed forces to challenge the guerrillas on the 
battlefield.  This military approach has led to an escalation of the conflict within 
Colombia and its spillover into Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Panama, all of 
which share borders with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)-controlled 
areas in which coca is produced.  Refugees and combatants cross the borders in 
increasing numbers, the latter seeking safe havens in which to rest and recuperate in 
preparation for further operations.  Drug production has also spread noticeably outside of 
Colombia’s borders, as a number of its neighbors have experienced a rise in coca 
cultivation.  
The resolve of the Uribe government to address Colombia’s problems 
aggressively and the resulting increase in spillover effects poses a number of challenges 
for Colombia’s neighbors.  Attempts to address the spillover effects generated by 
increased Colombian military operations will undoubtedly place economic, political and 
military burdens on most of Colombia’s neighbors, many of whom already have 
substantial domestic problems competing for government attention.  Although U.S. 
stakes in Colombia and the U.S. policy response have been extensively analyzed, much 
less study has been devoted to the interests and responses of neighboring countries and to 
articulating what form a regional response should take.    
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This thesis will argue that a regional military response, above economic and 
political measures, will be necessary to effectively defeat the triad of guerrillas, narco-
traffickers and paramilitaries and restore security within Colombia and the region.  
Political negotiation with the actors who promote instability has proved ineffective, and 
the moral foundations of those enemies of the state are questionable at best, effectively 
negating the legitimacy of any outside efforts at appeasement.  The dynamics of the 
conflict predictably negate either political or economic pressure implemented from a 
regional position; neither form of response can realistically be expected to convince the 
FARC to come to the peace table as similar “soft” approaches were attempted in the past 
by Colombia and they failed miserably.   
Operationally, Colombia’s military is faced with the daunting task of not only 
engaging guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitaries wherever they may exist, but also 
of controlling territory and protecting infrastructure and civilian populations.  A 
tremendous amount of manpower is necessary to perform what is essentially guard duty, 
and the requirement has detracted considerably from Colombia’s efforts to field a 
substantially larger combat force than it has in the past.  It will be years before Colombia 
has achieved the necessary amount of manpower to maintain control of territory and 
conduct effective combat operations against the insurgency.  It would seem then, that 
should a regional military response evolve, it would encompass a force that provides both 
the manpower and firepower to assist Colombia establish security and/or maintain 
legitimate control of it.  This thesis will suggest that the most appropriate classification 
for such a force would fall within the definition of a peacemaking mission, the purpose of 
this hypothetical force would ostensibly be to assist the Colombian security forces in 
attaining the compliance of insurgent groups; namely by establishing and/or maintaining 
legitimate control of territory within Colombia.  Such a stabilizing force would 
theoretically free the Colombian security forces from what is essentially guard duty and 
allow them to focus on the conduct of combat operations, at least until the point that 
belligerents have been convinced to negotiate a peaceful resolution.  While maintaining 
the capability for combat operations, the concept of employment for such a force would 
be to ensure that legitimate, state sponsored control of territory is maintained while the 
 xiv
Colombian military forces combat the entities in opposition to the state.  Establishing the 
mission statement of such a cooperative military force in Colombia would be a major 
requirement; in addition to being determined by the operational situation on the ground, 
























I. INTRODUCTION  
The Colombian problem is a common enemy to this continent’s democracy.  These violent 
groups in Colombia have the potential to destabilize all democracies in the region. 
   Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, September 2002 
 
A. OVERVIEW  
Colombia is in a state of war to gain control of its national territory and establish 
the rule of law within its borders. The instability brought about by the interrelated wars of 
insurgency, illegal drug trafficking and growing paramilitary activity has posed a direct 
threat to democracy in Colombia as the national government has demonstrated an 
inability to provide security for Colombian citizens.  More ominously, the crisis not only 
threatens democracy in Colombia, but it potentially poses a very real threat to security 
and democracy throughout the region.  The possibility of an expansion of the conflict into 
neighboring nations is real, yet there has been little in the way of regional cooperative 
effort to address the issue.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not a 
unified regional response to end the current crisis in Colombia is a necessity and if so, 
how likely such a response is and what form it might take.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Violence and instability have dominated the political and security scene within 
Colombia for many years.  This complex internal war involving guerrilla groups, 
narcotics traffickers and paramilitary groups has intensified since the mid 1990s and 
presented an increasingly lethal threat to democracy in Colombia.  In an effort to restore 
security and ensure democracy in the country, Colombia’s new president, Alvaro Uribe, 
has moved aggressively to take efforts to end the violence and restore some semblance of 
security in his country.  He is committed to restore the state’s authority and increase 
government presence throughout the country.  Abandoning the unsuccessful efforts of 
past presidents to negotiate with the insurgents, the Uribe government is committed to 
strengthening the capacity of the armed forces to challenge the guerrillas on the 
battlefield.  This military approach has led to an escalation of the conflict within 
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Colombia and its spillover into Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Panama, all of 
which share borders with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)-controlled 
areas in which coca is produced.  Refugees and combatants cross the borders in 
increasing numbers, the latter seeking safe havens in which to rest and recuperate in 
preparation for further operations.  Drug production has also spread noticeably outside of 
Colombia’s borders, as a number of its neighbors have experienced a rise in coca 
cultivation.  
 The resolve of the Uribe government to address Colombia’s problems 
aggressively and the resulting increase in spillover effects poses a number of challenges 
for Colombia’s neighbors.  Attempts to address the spillover effects generated by 
increased Colombian military operations will undoubtedly place economic, political and 
military burdens on most of Colombia’s neighbors, many of whom already have 
substantial domestic problems competing for government attention.  Although U.S. 
stakes in Colombia and the U.S. policy response have been extensively analyzed, much 
less study has been devoted to the interests and responses of neighboring countries and to 
articulating what form a regional response should take.   This thesis sets out to fill this 
void. 
The primary question addressed in this thesis is: 
• Is a regional cooperative effort critical to ending the crisis in Colombia?  If so, 
what shape should this effort take and under what conditions would this come to pass? 
Subsidiary questions are 
•  How does the conflict in Colombia pose a threat to regional security? 
• Does Colombia possess the capability to contain the threat/win the conflict 
without cooperative multilateral support? 
• What has the regional response been to assist Colombia end the conflict?  
• What factors explain the shape the regional response has taken to date? 
• What possible forms might a regional response take in the future and how 
effective will they be in contributing to a resolution of the crisis in Colombia? 
Chapter II of this thesis examines the history behind the current situation in 
Colombia and explores the effect that the conditions have had on democracy and security 
within Colombia.  Additionally this chapter details the threats the crisis poses for 
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neighboring countries and the possible effects on regional stability.  Finally, this chapter 
establishes the center of gravity within the crisis and the form the necessary response 
should take.  Ultimately, the chapter will argue that the conflict in Colombia does pose a 
threat to regional security; that weakening or defeating the insurgency will be the most 
important objective in a methodical approach to restoring stability; and that the use of 
military force will be the key component of any effective strategy implemented in 
Colombia.     
Chapter III evaluates the capability of the Colombian military to prosecute the 
conflict effectively.  It will focus on the structure, capabilities, will and shortcomings of 
the Colombian government and military in fighting the current conflict.  The chapter will 
argue that Colombia will require assistance from regional neighbors if the insurgency is 
to be decisively defeated and security restored within the region in an acceptable time 
period. 
Chapter IV examines the form that the regional response has taken and the 
possibilities of future responses.  It will explore the reactions to the crisis of each of 
Colombia’s neighbors, the obstacles to regional cooperative efforts and recent advances 
in cooperation.  Reactions from Colombia’s neighbors have been mixed, ranging from 
attempts to ignore the issues to rhetoric calling for increased regional cooperation to deal 
with the problem.  Obstacles to cooperation include long standing views on sovereignty, 
internal political and economic problems, resentment at the high level of U.S. 
involvement, and the lack of precedence for dealing with the type of conflict taking place 
in Colombia.  This chapter will argue that objections to regional cooperation towards 
Colombia are lessening, and that ultimately the dynamics of the crisis will positively 
influence the political will of Colombia’s neighbors to participate in a cooperative 
military effort to ensure regional security.   
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the thesis and evaluates the possible forms a 
regional response might take.  It will attempt to address the structural framework required 
to create and legitimize a regional military action, examine the precedence for the use of 
such a force, determine the requirements and roadblocks to implementation, and forecast 
what the most likely courses of regional cooperative action will ultimately be in 
Colombia.  This chapter will argue that even though a less politically risky course of 
3 
action will probably be undertaken, the most effective way to address the Colombian 
crisis from a regional cooperative standpoint will a military effort that operates in 
Colombia as a peacemaking force under international and regional mandate.    
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II. THE CURRENT CONFLICT 
Colombia has experienced a deterioration of democracy, economic progress, and 
social fabric due to the violence and instability brought about by the current conflict.  As 
Max G. Manwaring states in his monograph on security in the western hemisphere, this 
deterioration is graphically illustrated by the following facts: 
First, violence associated directly with internal turmoil is claiming over 
3,500 lives every year.  Second, violence is generating over 1.5 million 
displaced persons and 800,000 emigrants who are finding new homes in 
other countries in Latin America, the United States, Europe, and Canada.  
Third, Colombia’s internal turmoil is also inducing a contracting economy 
that declined by more than 5 percent in 1999 and has produced 20 percent 
unemployment and the worst recession since the 1930s.1 
 
The homicide rate in Colombia is the highest in the world and more than half the 
world’s kidnappings take place within its borders.2  The lack of security brought about by 
the 40 year old civil war has over time marginalized the government to the point where 
institutions no longer function in an acceptable fashion.  In fact, the argument can be 
made that Colombia’s sovereignty has ceased to exist due to the government’s inability to 
control its territory and protect its citizens.  Worse, the crisis presents an ominous threat 
to neighboring nations as it has the potential to endanger democracy on a regional level if 
its root causes are misunderstood and left unchecked.   
This chapter will first examine the history behind the current situation and then it 
will explore the effect on security within Colombia.  The third section of this chapter will 
attempt to ascertain what threats the crisis poses for neighboring countries and what the 
effect will be on regional stability.  Finally, Section D will attempt to establish what the 
center of gravity is within the crisis and what form the necessary response should take. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Max G. Manwaring, U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere:  Why Colombia, Why Now, 
and What is to be Done?, Implementing Plan Colombia Series, (The North South Center and Strategic 
Studies Institute, June 2001) p. 11 
2 Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, Towards Greater Peace and 
Security in Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy, (Report of an Independent Task Force 
sponsored by CFR and the IAD) September 2000, [http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=3828] 12 
February 2003  
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A.   THE ROOTS OF WAR IN COLOMBIA 
The current state of crisis in Colombia has its roots in the rather long saga of 
power mongering and violence that makes up a great deal of the recent history of the 
country.  The beginnings may be seen in the earliest nature of democracy within 
Colombia.  As Thomas Marks writes: 
Precisely why Colombia has this profile is a subject of much debate. The 
answer seems to be an early history that boils down to a squabbling group 
of settlers in a vast land with politics a zero-sum game.  The practical 
effect was that formal democracy, established in the mid-19th century, 
remained a truly winner-take-all proposition.3 
 
The winner-take-all form of politics meant that those who held office would do 
everything possible to hold on to power.  Ultimately this led to several civil wars 
including, from 1899 to 1902, the Thousand Day War in which more than 100,000 
persons are estimated to have been killed out of a population then of about four million.4  
The period of civil strife known as “La Violencia” subsequently occurred between 1947 
and 1958, stemming from clashes that took place between liberal reformers and 
conservatives in the 1930’s and 1940’s.  Liberal reformers had seized power and initiated 
agendas that gave birth to civil violence between the two parties.  The spark that set off 
La Violencia was the murder of a Liberal populist presidential candidate, Jorge Elecier 
Gaitan in 1948.  Liberals and Conservatives battled during La Violencia and most sources 
estimate that as many as 200,000 people were killed during that period.5  
Following La Violencia, the two major parties entered a period of peaceful co-
existence and alternated control via a power sharing agreement.  As a result of this pact, 
political parties had few incentives to compete seriously for the popular vote by offering 
solutions to the country’s long-term problems.  In addition, the competing interests of the 
executive and congressional branches of government has contributed to legislative 
stalemate and the inability of the central government to address pressing issues.  The two 
                                                 
3 Thomas Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, Implementing Plan Colombia: 
Strategic and Operational Imperatives Series (The North South Center and Strategic Studies Institute, 
January 2002) p. 2 
4 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, (London, University of California Press, Ltd, 
1993)  p. 151 
5 Richard L. Millett, Colombia’s Conflicts:  The Spillover Effects of a Wider War, Implementing Plan 
Colombia: Strategic and Operational Imperatives Series (The North South Center and Strategic Studies 
Institute, September 2002)  p. 6 
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branches have different concerns with congressional representatives focused on utilizing 
clientelism to maintain power in rural regions and the executive branch focused on 
improving the effectiveness of the central government.6  The lack of state integration and 
cohesion brought about by political infighting is to blame for the instability that has 
plagued Colombia for so long.  The lack of a focused effort towards problem solving 
effectively neutered the Colombian government.  
As a result of the weakened nature of the government and social unrest, leftist 
insurgencies began to appear on the scene during the Cold War.  Later, the powerful drug 
cartels were created and together they produced a new wave of domestic instability and 
violence.  The leftist insurgencies included the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  During the Cold War, both the FARC 
and ELN were funded by outside players: the FARC by the Soviet Union and the ELN by 
Cuba.  The same unstable environment that allowed the insurgencies to function also 
served as a “petri dish” for the emergence of the drug industry.  As Manwaring states: 
The illegal drug industry began to grow and prosper in this unstable 
environment of virtually uncontrolled violence, rural poverty, political 
disarray, and government weakness.  That prosperity in turn provided 
resources that allowed insurgent organizations to grow and expand.7 
 
While the end of the Cold War meant an end to a funding source for the FARC 
and the ELN, the drug cartels continued to thrive economically in a high demand market, 
even though they were being increasingly targeted by the U.S. and Colombia.  
Subsequently, the FARC, to a greater degree than the ELN, sought to link itself with the 
drug industry as a source of funding.  The Colombian Armed Forces estimate that the 
FARC currently gets between $200 and $400 million per year from involvement in 
narcotics trafficking, a figure estimated to be half its entire annual income.8  Likewise, 
the drug cartels, weakened somewhat from renewed counter drug efforts that were re-
energized with the end of the Cold War, were easier for the FARC to dominate and 
subsequently tax.  Thus, the two most destabilizing factors in Colombia, drug trafficking 
                                                 
6 Paul A. Beckley, Maintaining the Violent Status Quo:  The Political Economy of the Colombian 
Crisis, (Masters Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey California 2002) p. 51 
7 Max G. Manwaring, Nonstate Actors in Colombia:  Threat and Response, (The North South Center 
and Strategic Studies Institute,  May 2002) p. 2 
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and insurgency, were linked and their union multiplied the level of violence within 
Colombia.  The Colombian government’s inability to deal effectively with either threat 
gave rise to a third factor causing the current problems in the country:  the self-defense 
paramilitary groups.  The paramilitaries were formed and funded privately by right wing 
elites and by newly wealthy drug traffickers as a form of protection against the tactics of 
the insurgents that targeted wealthy land owners; they gained strength throughout the 
1980’s, although their tactics resulted in them being declared illegal by the Colombian 
government in 1989.9  
The drug traffickers, insurgent groups and paramilitaries all are contributors to the 
current situation in Colombia, and the triad has it roots in the unstable and volatile 
Colombian political system that allowed each group to flourish.  Section B of this chapter 
will examine exactly what the triad’s effect has been on security within Colombia.    
B.   EFFECT ON SECURITY IN COLOMBIA 
The instability and lack of security in Colombia brought about by insurgents, drug 
traffickers and paramilitaries directly threaten the survival of democracy and the 
legitimacy of state institutions.  To be completely accurate, however, this assessment 
should be considered in terms of a vicious cycle in which the lack of strong central 
government has allowed violence and instability to fester which in turn has further 
weakened the state by eroding democratic processes and negating the effectiveness of 
state institutions.   
There is no doubt that Colombia is a democracy (albeit a flawed one as evidenced 
by the previous section); there are free elections, freedom of political action and civilian 
control of the armed forces.10  However, the lack of security and instability has brought 
about an erosion of democracy in Colombia as elected officials and other public figures 
fall victim to political violence.  As Manwaring notes, the degree of political violence in 
Colombia is stunning: 
                                                 
8 The Center for International Policy’s Colombian Project, Information About the Combatants 20 July 
2002, [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm]  29 July 2002 
9 The Center for International Policy’s Colombian Project, Information About the Combatants 20 July 
2002, [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm] 29 July 2002 
10 Tom Bruneau, Juan Linz’ Framework and Contemporary Colombia:  Did President Uribe Read the 
Book?, (Center for Civil Military Relations, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, 2003)  
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Numerous government officials have been assassinated following their 
election-138 mayors and 569 members of parliament, deputies, and city 
council members were murdered between 1989 and 1999, along with 174 
public officials in other positions.  This is not to mention the judiciary.  In 
1987 alone, 53 members of the judiciary were assassinated.11 
 
The numbers are incredible and speak volumes about the nature and reality of the 
conflict and its impact on democratic procedures.  The violence undermines the right of 
citizens to participate in politics, the ability of elected officials to exercise power, and 
ultimately the faith of citizens in the ability of democracy to offer effective governance.   
At the most basic level of the democratic process, violence prevents Colombian 
citizens from exercising their right to vote.  During the presidential elections of 2002, out 
going President Andres Pastrana predicted that despite the deployment of more than 
210,000 security forces throughout Colombia, voting would be “impossible” in 
approximately seven percent of the country.12  In fact, during the election many citizens 
were prevented from exercising their right to vote as at least 11 towns were unable to 
conduct elections and the FARC destroyed ballots in a least five cities.13    
In addition, elected officials are handicapped in their attempts to exercise power 
by the violence; kidnappings, death threats and assassinations no doubt influence the 
decision making process for leaders of the state.  The FARC is holding more than 800 
hostages, including senators, governors, a presidential candidate and mayors, as well as 
police and members of the armed forces.14  The most recent example of the kidnapping 
and assassination tactic was the FARC killing of a provincial governor and the former 
Minister of Defense, both of whom had been kidnapped and held by the guerrilla group 
since April 2002.  Both were shot and killed by the FARC when the government 
attempted a rescue in May 2003.   
                                                 
11 Max G. Manwaring, Nonstate Actors in Colombia:  Threat and Response, (The North South Center 
and Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002) p. 13 
12 Agence France Presse, “Isolated incidents reported as Colombians vote in presidential elections,” 
Agence France Presse, 26 May 2002 
13 Frances Robles, “Colombia Elects Uribe: Hard-liner Set to Take Majority as Violence Ruins 
Election in 11 Towns,” The Gazette, (Montreal), 27 May 2002 
14 Agence France Presse, “Rebels kill Colombian governor and former defense minister,” Agence 
France Presse, 6 May 2003 
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Ultimately, the level of political violence in Colombia has to undermine its 
citizens’ faith in the ability of the government to provide solutions to problems; if voting 
is not guaranteed and political decision making potentially influenced by the amount of 
violence, then it is easy to conceptualize how a resigned, fatalistic attitude toward the 
efficacy of the democratic process might develop in Colombia’s citizens.  In addition, the 
conflict has hastened the erosion of an arguably already weak central authority in a cycle 
that grows in momentum with every turn.  State and local governments most affected by 
the violence have felt ignored by the central government and this sense of abandonment 
has resulted in a loss of faith in the authority of the central government and the ability of 
democratic institutions to resolve the people’s problems.15   
The second area in which the conflict has negatively affected the Colombian state 
is in regards to the disintegration of state institutions.  Rampant corruption and lack of 
governmental control in vast areas of the country have conspired to greatly weaken the 
legitimacy of state institutions and further erode public opinion regarding the 
effectiveness of the government.  Corruption has seriously degraded the government’s 
ability to deliver services to its citizens.  Corruption is so entrenched within the 
government that it has become an accepted form of wielding power.  As Nagle argues: 
Traditionally, one’s reputation and success in politics has been measured 
by one’s success in adhering to the principle that no one general law 
applies to all and at all times.  Each individual is regulated by whatever 
law one can secure from one’s leaders.  In this way, a politician expects to 
demonstrate his ability to shield his supporters from the rigorous 
application of the laws and thus a protracted patron/client relationship is 
consummated.16 
 
Political corruption manifests itself in a number of areas; selection and promotion 
for appointed government jobs, influence of private interests on state activities, and state 
spending.  The dishonest management of public funds in Colombia, according to the 
World Bank, results in the loss of more than 2 billion pesos each year.17  The 
complexities of the current conflict exacerbate the problem by multiplying the existing 
                                                 
15 Luz E. Nagle, Plan Colombia:  Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric 
Security, (The North South Center and Strategic Studies Institute, December 2002)  p. 21 
16 Nagle, p. 14 
17 Financial Times Information, “Uribe Issues Presidential Directive To Fight Corruption,” Financial 
Times Information, 21 August 2002 
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level of corruption to a greater degree; the financial strength that drug trafficking 
provides to associated guerrilla groups with the political ideology to work counter to a 
strong state presence are fuel for the fire that is corruption in Colombia.   
 
Figure 1. Zones of Illegal Armed Group Activity18 
Another indicator of the implosion of state institutions is that the Colombian 
government has never been able to exercise effective control or apply the rule of law over 
large areas of its territory.  Due in part to the lack of presence of security forces and the 
protection they provide, institutions that are designed to protect Colombian citizens have 
weakened to the point of being non-effective in large parts of the country.  Two statistics 
bring home the woeful record of the police and judicial institutions:   One is that the rate 
                                                 
18The Center for International Policy’s Colombian Project, Information About the Combatants, 20 
July 2002,[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.html ] 15 December 2002  
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of violent crime and homicide levels are among the highest in the world.19  Second, the 
proportion of homicides that end with a conviction is less than 4 percent.20  In addition, 
government presence is lacking in over 60 percent of the rural municipalities of the 
country.21  Colombia’s inability to establish control over large portions of its territory is 
graphically demonstrated in Figure 1.  The map is designed to show the zones in which 
the FARC, ELN and paramilitaries carry out illegal activity.  It is color coded, with the 
FARC area in green, ELN in blue and the AUC in red, and overlap in brown and purple.  
It is rather obvious that the institutions designed to protect and provide for Colombian 
citizens have been seriously degraded by the current crisis, further undermining the 
legitimacy of the state. 
In sum, the conflict in Colombia has resulted in a lack of security that directly 
threatens to collapse Colombia by undermining the legitimacy of the state.  The conflict 
has dangerously weakened the central government through the erosion of democratic 
processes and state institutions which when combined directly threaten the state as a 
whole.  The intricacies of the conflict result in a vicious cycle that, unless solved, will 
continue to weaken Colombia, perhaps irreparably.  Of perhaps even greater concern is 
the very real possibility of the conflict spilling over into neighboring nations and having 
similar results.  Section C of this chapter will determine what threat the conflict in 
Colombia poses to neighboring nations.   
C.  THE THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY 
As serious as the threat to democracy and security is within Colombia, a more 
ominous possibility is that the conflict might spill over into neighboring countries, 
causing the same instability albeit on a larger, regional scale.  The stability and well 
being of the states of the Andean Ridge have been indirectly threatened by Colombia’s 
complicated conflict for some time, but increasingly there are signs that the threat is 
becoming a more direct reality.  As a recent report sponsored by the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue notes: 
                                                 
19 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment-South America, Internal Affairs, Colombia, 2002, [http://80-
www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil ]14 December, 2002 
20Max G. Manwaring, Nonstate Actors in Colombia:  Threat and Response, (The North South Center 
and Strategic Studies Institute, May 2002) p. 14  
21 Manwaring, p.14 
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Colombia’s deterioration spreads instability and conflict beyond its 
borders.  Insurgent and paramilitary groups have made frequent incursions 
into the neighboring countries of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama.  Such 
incursions could well increase.  The wider region is increasingly uncertain, 
reflecting both real spillover effects and independent, troublesome 
political developments.22 
 
The spillover occurs on a number of fronts:  large refugee flows out of Colombia 
and away from the affected border regions, increased drug cultivation in neighboring 
nations, and increased cross border movement of guerrilla groups and paramilitaries.  
Refugees from the crisis include not only Colombians but also citizens of neighboring 
countries eager to remove themselves from the violent conditions that are becoming more 
prevalent.  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
Colombia has between 450,000 to 1.6 million persons that have been internally displaced 
by the conflict.23  That is a tremendous amount considering that the total population of 
Colombia is estimated at 41 million.24  It may also be an ominous hint of what may occur 
in surrounding nations as the conflict increasingly spills over into neighboring countries.   
Drug cultivation has spread from Colombia to neighboring countries as 
eradication efforts within Colombia have forced coca producers into other areas more 
suitable for development. In 2002, as the area of coca cultivation decreased slightly in 
Colombia from 2001 to 2002, it rose in Bolivia and Peru to the combined amount of more 
than seven thousand hectares.25 And while narco-traffickers have for some time operated 
across Colombia’s borders, a more serious sign of the spreading conflict is increasing 
evidence that guerrilla groups as well have started to operate outside of Colombia.  As 
reported in a recent article in the San Diego Tribune:    
Colombia’s guerrillas and drug traffickers have been crossing in growing 
numbers into neighboring Brazil, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
                                                 
22 Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-American Dialogue, Towards Greater Peace and 
Security in Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy, (Report of an Independent Task Force 
sponsored by CFR and the IAD) September 2000, [http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=3828]  14 
February 2003 
23 William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threats to Regional Security,” Military Review, (May/June 2001) 
p. 4 
24 United States Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Colombia, (Central Intelligence 
Agency) 19 March 2003, [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/co.html#People] 7 May 2003 
25 United States Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2002, (U.S. 
State Department, March 2003) p. 14 
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And President Alvaro Uribe’s 2-month-old government’s military 
offensive against the guerrillas is likely to push growing numbers of rebels 
across the country’s borders, military analysts say.26  
The incursion of guerrilla forces into neighboring countries has brought the 
violence of the insurgency to those countries.  Inevitably the paramilitaries pursue the 
guerrilla groups across international borders and that has resulted in increased violence 
inside Colombia’s neighbors. Inarguably the conflict in Colombia poses a threat to the 
region, mostly visibly in the form of increased refugee flow, increased drug cultivation 
and increased levels of violence as a result of cross border guerrilla group movement.  
Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil all share borders with areas of Colombia 
and all have been affected to some degree by the crisis.  The remainder of this section 
will explore the threat to the region on an individual country basis, examining what the 
Colombian crisis has meant to each Andean Ridge nation.   
Panama has been particularly hard hit by the crisis in Colombia.  Refugee flows 
from Colombia have caused problems for Panama by placing a burden on already limited 
resources within the country; in fact the issue is serious enough that several humanitarian 
organizations have had to provide refugee assistance within the country.27  Violence 
brought about by the incursions of guerrilla and paramilitary groups also has had a 
negative impact on the country.  Panama has not maintained a military force since 1989 
and as a result has been extremely vulnerable to cross border operations by guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups; both groups routinely cross the border. FARC and paramilitary 
activity has been especially prevalent since the mid 1990’s as FARC cells send troops 
into Panama’s Darien Province to re-supply, rest and relax, while the paramilitaries 
pursue them there in an attempt to destroy them.28  The battalion-sized FARC fronts 
operating in the Darien have also developed a support structure to expedite the flow of 
drugs out of Colombia.29  It is evident that Panama has serious problems with regards to 
dealing with spillover effects from the Colombian crisis.  The lack of a military or even 
                                                 
26 Andres Oppenheimer, “A Military Force for South America?,” The San Diego Tribune, 7 October 
2002 
27William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threats to Regional Security,” Military Review, (May/June 2001) 
p. 10 
28Mendel p. 10 
29 Angel Rabas and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth:  The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (RAND, 2001) p. 85 
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competent security force has allowed the problem unfettered access in Panama.  Thus far, 
the problems have been confined to the Darien Province, which is rather remote. 
However, considering the suspect ability of the Panamanian security forces, it is certainly 
not out of the question to imagine a scenario in which the FARC could move to threaten 
the Panama Canal in a possible attempt to garner international attention by seizing a 
strategic objective.   
Ecuador has also been the recipient of a great deal of overflow effect from 
Colombia; here too there has been a steady influx of refugees and guerrillas crossing the 
border along with increased coca and heroin cultivation that has migrated from 
Colombia.  The refugee problem is a serious one for Ecuador, a country already 
experiencing a host of economic and political problems, including five presidents in as 
many years and servicing a foreign debt that takes up a large part of the national budget.  
The U.S. Committee for Refugees estimated that in 2001 more than 2,100 Colombians 
sought refuge in Ecuador and that approximately 30,000 Colombian refugees were 
already living in Ecuador at the end of 1999.30  Ecuador has also become a haven for 
insurgent guerrillas as FARC units seek out areas for re-supply and R&R.  Additionally, 
the guerrillas have established settlements for family members within the northern part of 
the country and pro-FARC mayors have reportedly even taken office in some northern 
Ecuadorian cities.31  As is the case in Panama, the violence of the crisis has also spilled 
over into Ecuador.  Paramilitary units have predictably pursued FARC units into Ecuador 
to attack their logistics network and also to compete for coca harvests.  The increase in 
drug cultivation was noted by General Pete Pace, Combatant Commander for U.S. 
Southern Command, when he testified before the U.S. Senate in 2001 that nurseries of 
coca and heroin poppy seedlings had been found in parts of northern Ecuador.32  A 
further issue that is cause for concern is the level of support for the FARC among 
Ecuadorian citizens who live along the border.  As noted by William Mendel, the 
                                                 
30 US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 2002 Ecuador Country Report, 
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Ecuadorian army estimates that as many as 60 percent of the residents in border towns 
are sympathetic to the FARC.33  There is a real fear that the FARC could possibly recruit 
new membership from a supportive population within Ecuador and that such a home 
grown threat could threaten state institutions in an already politically and economically 
weakened country, much as has occurred in Colombia.   
Refugees, violence and drug cultivation also characterize the spillover effect of 
the Colombian crisis on Venezuela.  Violence generated between the FARC and 
paramilitaries has affected the civilian population along the border and led to thousands 
of Colombians seeking asylum in Venezuela.  In one incident in 1999, a paramilitary 
attack on suspected FARC sympathizers resulted in 3,500 Colombians crossing the 
border seeking refuge in Venezuela.34  Criminal violence has also taken its toll, with the 
guerrilla groups carrying out kidnappings and extortion operations all along the 
Venezuelan border.  The meat and milk industries have been adversely affected by the 
number of kidnappings along the border, with some sources reporting as many as one 
every 72 hours.35  Drug production has also moved into Venezuela, with sources 
estimating as many as 8 hectares of coca cultivation within the Serrania de Perija region 
and the destruction of three cocaine base labs in the same area by Venezuelan officials in 
2001.36  Venezuela finds itself in an unsavory position with regards to the crisis in 
Colombia because it is facing its own internal political and economic problems.  A nation 
in such a weakened state is particularly vulnerable to infiltration by guerrilla groups 
intent on expanding cross border operations and the paramilitary groups attempting to 
stop and/or compete with them.  The conflict has also complicated somewhat President 
Hugo Chavez’s efforts to govern, as members of the Venezuelan military accuse him of 
supporting the FARC.37  Finally, as one of the leading producers of oil in the world, 
Venezuela plays a critical role in global security issues.  Justifiably, there are concerns 
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about how any detrimental effects imposed on Venezuela by the Colombian crisis might 
then adversely affect the world stage.   
Peru has not been affected by the crisis to the degree of the previously examined 
countries.  A remote, dense jungle encompasses much of the Peru-Colombia border, an 
area that is devoid of population and thus means of support for Colombian guerrillas.  
Accordingly, Peru does not face the refugee and violence problem currently seen in 
Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela.  However, Peru has not remained unscathed by the 
Colombian crisis.  There have been reports of some degree of FARC activity inside Peru, 
perhaps in conjunction with a re-emergence of Peru’s own insurgent groups, Sendero 
Luminoso and Tupac Amaru.38  Additionally, a well documented arms trafficking 
scandal was serious enough to contribute to the downfall of President Alberto Fujimori’s 
government in 2000, as Fujimori’s National Intelligence Service Chief Vladimiro 
Montesinos Torres was implicated in an international operation that apparently delivered 
10,000 assault rifles to the FARC.39    
Brazil is the fifth country that borders Colombia and it too has faced considerable 
challenges as a result of the Colombian crisis.  Similar to the situation in Venezuela, 
Brazil has been forced to deal with violence brought about by guerrilla incursions and to 
a lesser degree a refugee problem.  The vast nature of the Amazon makes it a daunting 
task, but Brazil has an interest in maintaining control of its borders and preventing 
transnational movement of guerrilla forces.  Nevertheless, the FARC has been active in 
Brazil’s border regions for years and there have been several well documented incidents 
of spillover violence perpetrated by the FARC within Brazilian territory.  The 
relationship between the FARC and the drug trade cannot be overlooked as a causal 
factor for these incursions; the geography of Brazil, with its vast forested areas and 
extensive river systems, is well suited for drug trafficking and the guerrillas have 
aggressively attempted to capitalize on this for purposes of sustainment. 
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In sum, the potential spillover from the conflict in Colombia poses a very real and 
dangerous threat to the neighboring countries in the region.  The violence within 
Colombia’s borders can quickly migrate from Colombia to Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Peru and Brazil and not only cause minor amounts of instability, but also undermine the 
sovereignty, legitimacy and well being of each of those countries.  As a result, the crisis 
in Colombia poses a serious security concern for all nations in the region.  The given is 
that the crisis in Colombia poses a very real regional threat; the uncertainty is how to 
eliminate that threat.  Part D of this chapter will attempt to provide recommendations on 
what actions should be undertaken to restore stability and security within Colombia and 
possibly prevent an expanded regional crisis. 
D.  THE CENTER OF GRAVITY AND THE NECESSARY RESPONSE  
The situation in Colombia is an extremely complicated one where no easy 
solution seems clearly and readily apparent.  The triad of drugs, guerrilla insurgency and 
paramilitary groups has become so convoluted and intertwined that picking just one 
aspect to address may seem overly simplistic. However, devising a well thought out 
response requires at least an attempt to identify the source of power and will that sustains 
the conflict in Colombia and systematic method for defeating it.  This section will posit 
two key points:  1) Colombia must first address and defeat the insurgency if it hopes to 
restore security and achieve peace, eliminate the paramilitaries and reduce the drug 
problem; and 2) The most important factor in a multi-faceted attempt to restore security 
in Colombia and ostensibly within the region will be strong military action.  
To achieve victory in the current conflict, Colombia will first have to analyze 
methodically the interrelated factors that combine to create insecurity and threaten the 
existence of the state.  It will then be necessary for Colombia to engage, systematically 
and with overwhelming force, each entity separately.  Any attempts to address the triad of 
drugs, guerrillas and paramilitaries simultaneously will ultimately prove to be an 
ineffective attempt in the sense of trying to accomplish too much with too few resources.  
The recommended systematic approach to conflict resolution is rooted in the concept of 
center of gravity.  In any conflict, sources of the belligerent’s strengths can be mental, 
moral, or physical; any combination may result in tangible elements of power, or 
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intangible elements such as strength of will.40  Subsequently, the essence of any 
successful warfighting effort requires that such centers of gravity be identified and a 
methodical plan developed to defeat the enemy by dismantling those centers.  In 
Colombia, the triad of drug traffickers, guerrilla groups and paramilitaries all contribute 
to generate the “enemy”: violence, lack of security and general instability.  Each element 
of the triad could conceivably be labeled the center of gravity, as each one is a key 
component that contributes to the conflict.  However, in devising a plan to restore 
security within its borders, Colombia should avoid attempting to address each element of 
the triad simultaneously; the result will be a prolonged, diluted effort that fails to achieve 
tangible results.  Colombia must identify what its main effort will be in the conflict and 
put all resources behind it, defeating piecemeal the triad of insurgency, drug trafficking 
and paramilitary activity.   
Establishing which element of the triad to address first involves a process of 
elimination.  In the case of the paramilitaries it is quite simple: take away the guerrilla 
groups and the drug trafficking, and the paramilitaries will most likely follow.  The 
paramilitaries arose in response to the lack of state control over violent crime that erupted 
as a result of drug trafficking and guerrilla activity.  In essence, were it not for either of 
those two factors and lack of government presence in rural areas, it could be argued that 
the paramilitaries would not exist or, if they continued as a presence, it would be from a 
greatly weakened political and moral position, as their stated reason for existing would no 
longer serve as justification for continued operations.  Eliminating drug trafficking as the 
key element to attack first is a harder argument, but arguably reestablishing control of 
territory by destroying the insurgency will undermine drug trafficking by making it easier 
to eradicate illegal narcotics cultivation.   As long as the FARC and ELN are operating at 
will and capable of waging conventional military operations, establishing control over the 
drug problem is not really possible.  Additionally, it can be argued that the guerrilla 
groups may have actually strengthened the drug industry by association.  In 1982 the 
FARC made a decision to align itself with the drug industry in Colombia as a means of 
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generating support for itself in the form of funding and manpower.41  This link may be a 
key factor explaining how the drug industry actually flourished instead of collapsing 
since the elimination of the large drug cartels in the 1990’s.   
The process of elimination has left the insurgency as the element to defeat first.  
Further evidence to support this comes from an examination of the goals and objectives 
of the different violent actors and lessons drawn from Peru’s experiences in dealing with 
a dual threat from drugs and terrorists.  First, the goals and objectives of the insurgency 
are more threatening to the Colombian state than the goals of drug traffickers and 
paramilitaries.  It can be argued that the narco-traffickers seek to maintain the status quo 
to ply their trade while the paramilitaries in fact desire a strengthened state that maintains 
the monopoly on the use of force.  The insurgency, on the other hand,  
is a political campaign to mobilize the disaffected and the dispossessed 
into an alternative society.  Always their ultimate goal in deploying power 
is to create and safeguard the alternative to the society that they are 
creating.42 
 
The FARC’s attempts to mobilize popular support in an “alternative society” have 
failed miserably, and as a result they have relied on violence and kidnapping in their 
attempts to dominate the human terrain.  As part of this strategy, they have taken control 
of large areas of the countryside from which to attempt to dominate population centers.  
The guerrilla groups, unlike the narco-traffickers or paramilitaries, also maintain a 
political agenda, making it a more serious threat to the Colombian government since its 
objective is to overthrow the current political system.  This are several implications of 
this, not the least of which is that the guerrilla groups are the only part of the triad to seek 
an overthrow of the Colombian government through violent measures.   
There is also regional historical precedence to back the claim for addressing the 
insurgency first.  Peru’s strategy in fighting insurgency and drug trafficking provides 
valuable insight into the methodology of determining a main effort within the context of a 
complex conflict and then massing resources to defeat the problem methodically.  Faced 
with the simultaneous threats of drug trafficking and insurgency in the early 1990’s, 
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Fujimori’s government decided to concentrate on defeating terrorism before addressing 
the drug problem.  As stated in the National Defense University’s Strategic Assessment 
of 1999, “Once its [Peru’s] insurgency was defeated, the state was able to mount a more 
effective national campaign against drug trafficking organizations, and U.S. assistance 
had a more substantial impact.”43   In fact, after eliminating the threat Peru, free from 
experiencing the terrorism wrought by Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement, was able to reduce the area under coca cultivation by half.44  
In sum, the Colombian government must methodically analyze the inter-related 
elements of the conflict, decide which is the key center of gravity and then mass 
resources in a focus of effort to defeat that element before addressing the other two.  This 
section has argued that the insurgency should be addressed first, and that defeating it will 
enable Colombia to address more effectively the drug traffickers and paramilitaries.    
The second point of this section is making the case for the necessity of defeating 
the triad of insurgency, drug trafficking and paramilitary activity through strong military 
action rather than solely through political or economic means.  Key to this argument is 
whether or not the guerrilla groups will ever renounce violent methods in pursuit of their 
objectives.  As stated earlier, the goal of the FARC is the creation of an alternative 
society, the overthrow of the government and installation of a Marxist-Leninist regime.  
As Manwaring notes, “The stated intent is to create an army of 30,000 with which to 
stage a ‘final offensive’ against the regular armed forces and ‘do away with the state as it 
now exists in Colombia.’”45  What is most important to draw from guerrilla rhetoric is 
their insistence on utilizing violent means to achieve their end goal of a new system of 
government in Colombia.  Political solutions have most definitely failed to achieve any 
viable results in seeking an end to the conflict, as the FARC’s fixation on violence has 
been emphasized by their continued unwillingness to engage effectively in the numerous 
peace process attempts that were undertaken by previous Colombian governments.  
Additionally, the guerrillas’ lack of public support, cited as less than 2 percent of the 
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population in one source,46 leads the FARC to rely heavily on torture, assassination, 
extortion and intimidation in an attempt through force to generate popular support 
towards their alternative political stance.  In essence, the FARC has no other choice but 
to pursue purely violent means to achieve their ultimate goal of government overthrow.  
Neither their desired end state nor the means they have attempted to utilize in achieving 
their goal are acceptable; and because past diplomatic efforts at appeasement have failed 
to change their goals and methods, it seems clear that it will require military force to end 
the threat posed by the FARC.  This viewpoint seems to have a great deal of historical 
precedence. As Gabriel Marcella states: 
The principal lesson learned in successful modern counterinsurgencies, 
such as in the Philippines, Malay, El Salvador, and Oman, is that the 
battlefield must be linked to the peace process.  A real peace process 
ending in conflict termination is only possible when the armed forces of 
the government establish enough asymmetry on the battlefield to convince 
the insurgents that further war is counterproductive to their physical and 
political survival. 47 
 
Thus far in the Colombian crisis, the FARC has remained unconvinced that 
further prosecution of their goals is counterproductive to their survival.  This is because 
the military effort, to date, has not been strong enough to force a change in their goals 
and objectives.   
Increasing the Colombian military’s capacity to defeat the insurgency or bring 
them to the negotiating table will also contribute to resolving the two remaining elements 
of the Colombian crisis.  Although the paramilitaries will likely fade with the demise of 
the guerrilla groups, those who fail to lay down their arms will have to be dealt with 
militarily.  In addition, an enhanced military capacity is essential for addressing illegal 
drug activity.  In a nation where drug cultivation exploded in the mid 1990’s and has 
remained at an extremely high level ever since,48 a focused, manpower and resource 
intensive effort will be needed to reduce the amount of cocaine flowing from Colombia.  
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Here again, a strong military effort will be required to contain this problem, given the 
vast area of Colombia and the firepower capability possessed by the drug traffickers.   
This chapter has examined the history of the conflict in Colombia, the effect that 
the lack of security has had inside the country, and the very real threat that the conflict 
poses regionally.  Additionally, this chapter has argued that after a methodical, systematic 
approach is taken in developing a strategy for addressing the triad of insurgency, drug 
trafficking and paramilitary activity, the first objective of the Colombian government 
should be to defeat the guerrilla insurgency.  Further, the use of military force, above 
political and economic means, will be the key to restoring order and security in 
Colombia.  The question becomes whether Colombia can handle the problem without 
external assistance.  Chapter III will explore the ability of the Colombian military to 
prosecute a decisive campaign against the triad of insurgents, drug traffickers and 





































III. COLOMBIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
Chapter II of this thesis suggested that the key to reestablishing security within 
Colombia and the region will be the strong use of military force, above and beyond 
political and economic strategies.  If one accepts that this is a sound course of action, then 
the next logical step would be an exploration of the possibility of implementing such a 
course of action, and key to that is an examination of the Colombian security forces, in 
particular the military.  This chapter will explore the missions, structure, capabilities and 
shortcomings of the security forces in Colombia, and offer recommendations to ensure 
the military strategy will restore security in Colombia and the region.    
A.  SECURITY FORCES STRUCTURE AND MISSIONS 
The security forces of Colombia are organized under the Ministry of Defense and 
are composed of an army, navy (including marines and coast guard), air force and 
national police.  The National Police are considered a paramilitary organization and 
function as an important auxiliary force to the army in an internal security role as well as 
assume primary responsibility for counter narcotic missions.  The president is designated 
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces while the minister of defense theoretically 
exercises both operational and administrative control over the armed forces and national 
police.  In reality, the minister of defense exercises control of the military through the 
most senior military command, the General Command, which is headed by the Armed 
Forces commander and his staff.  Conversely, the National Police, while theoretically 
controlled by the minister of defense, has direct access to the president (this access is 
generally attributed to the emphasis on the prosecution of the drug war within Colombia).  
Below the General Command, each of the armed forces branches also has its own 
commander in chief and general staff, organized closely along the model of U.S. military 
structure.  The security forces, including all components within the Ministry of Defense, 
are made up of roughly 265,000 members.  Approximately 168,000 personnel, roughly 
two thirds of the security forces, are military personnel spread among the three branches 














FIGURE 2.  Security Forces Breakdown49 
 
The mission of the Colombian armed forces is to defend the country against 
external attack and to ensure internal security.  Internal security includes control of 
territorial waters and the land area encompassed by the country’s borders and the 
Colombian military maintains the capability of conducting counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorist operations.  Additionally, the military conducts civic action projects and 
also provides transport service to isolated rural areas.50  Historically, Colombia has been 
fairly isolated and not threatened by serious foreign attack since the days of its 
independence, largely due to the fact that the heart of the country is located in hard to 
reach, relatively inaccessible parts of the Andes.51  Due in part to lack of a significant 
external threat, the Colombian military has focused almost entirely on addressing the 
internal threat posed by guerrilla groups; internal security missions and counter-
insurgency operations have taken precedence for some decades due to threats posed at 
different times by the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), the April 19 Movement (M19), 
the ELN, and the FARC.  The focus on combating guerrilla groups over the years has 
meant that Colombia’s security forces have gained considerable experience in the 
counterinsurgent role, compounded by the anti-drug activities of the last decade.  The 
focus on internal security is also reflected in the organization of units geographically:  the 
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army has 5 divisions, each with a specific area of operations and responsibility within the 
country.  Each division is made up of three brigades typically, each with three conscript 
battalions and one counter-guerrilla battalion (BCG).    
Of the 140,000 soldiers in the army, there are now approximately 60,000 who are 
considered professional soldiers (such as those who serve in the counter-guerrilla 
battalions) with the remainder considered to be conscripts who serve 1.5 years within a 
conscript battalion and then pass to the reserve.  All recruits are trained in schools rather 
than units and all officers are selected from the cadet school in Bogota, with further 
specialty training at specific arms schools.52  Military service has traditionally been 
obligatory for all males over the age of 18, instituted in the form of a selective service.  In 
the past, the system produced a great deal of inequality as those who possessed a high 
school diploma were exempt from serving in combat units.  Money could also be used to 
buy one’s way out of service, the resulting situation being that the poor and uneducated 
served disproportionately in the ranks.  New reforms under President Uribe have started 
to change the policy, however, as he has vowed to increase the number of professional 
soldiers by 10,000 every year (from 2001 to 2004).53  In April 2003, the Ministry of 
Defense sent a draft legislative decree to congress that, if passed, will unify the obligatory 
military service policy for all Colombians, regardless of social, educational, or economic 
status.  The decree specifies that there will be no difference in the terms of service 
between regular soldiers and high school graduates; all will serve in the military as either  
soldiers (the army and air force), as marine infantrymen (the navy), or as police assistants 
in the National Police for a period between 12 and 24 months 54   
Of the 60,000 professional soldiers, about 35,000 are available for combat at any 
one time, and these soldiers are organized into a number of highly capable units.55  There 
are the counter-guerrilla battalions in each division as mentioned above, and in 1999 the 
government inaugurated a new Rapid Deployment Force (Fuerza de Despliegue Rapida) 
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to conduct counter guerrilla operations in remote areas of the country.  The force is 
essentially the elite of the Colombian Army and includes three Mobile Brigades (BRIM) 
and a Special Forces Brigade.  The specific mission of the RDF at its inception was to 
“carry out highly mobile counter-insurgency offensives on strategic targets to smash the 
subversives' will to fight.”56  Additionally, the 2000-2001 U.S. aid package funded the 
creation of three “counter-narcotics” battalions that totaled 2,400 new soldiers.  Due to a 
change in U.S. policy as a result of events on 11 September 2001, those battalions will 
now be allowed to be used in a counter-insurgency role. 
   Equipment maintained by the Colombian military is indicative of the emphasis 
that has been placed on internal security and counter-insurgency operations.  Instead of 
large numbers of strategic weapons such as fighters and armored vehicles, Colombia has 
focused on maintaining a larger ratio of personnel to equipment than most other Latin 
American militaries.  Although it doesn’t include helicopter numbers, Figure 3 
graphically demonstrates that Colombia has placed a high priority on personnel, above 
equipment allocations, when viewed comparatively with other Latin American nations. 









Argentina   69,000 1,463 123 18 
Bolivia   33,500    168   39 None 
Brazil 305,000 1,194 234 23 
Chile   83,000    986   64 24 
Colombia 168,800    300   46   8 
Ecuador   57,500    264   48 15 
Guyana     1,630        9 None None 
Paraguay   19,200      63   11 None 
Peru 120,000    570   86 17 
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Suriname     3,140      24     5 None 
Uruguay   24,690    179   11   2 
Venezuela   79,000    601   73   8 
Notes: 
1.Notincludingreserves. 
2.Includes army and navy aviation, but not helicopters or combat-capable trainers.
3. Major surface combatants, missile craft and submarines included in naval vessel totals. 
 
FIGURE 3.  Regional Defense Comparison57 
A closer examination of the total equipment and personnel numbers of the major 
nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) is telling.  
Although rather unscientific, dividing the total number of armed forces personnel by the 
total numbers of major weapons systems listed for each country results in a ratio of 
personnel to equipment that may be used as an indicator of the level of emphasis each 
country has placed on military hardware and personnel.  Argentina maintains the lowest 
ratio, at 43:1 (43 personnel for every major piece of equipment), with Venezuela at 115:1 
and Brazil at 218:1.  Colombia has by far the highest personnel to equipment ratio of the 
countries compared, with 476 personnel for every piece of equipment.  While there can 
be many interpretations of those figures, they do seem to indicate that historically 
Colombia has indeed placed a higher emphasis on the assets needed to conduct counter-
insurgency, namely people. 
The National Police were established in 1891 and are responsible for maintaining 
public order over all national territory.  The primary role of the police force is the 
prevention, investigation and control of crime, along with the provision of security and 
peace for the citizens of Colombia.  The instability over the last 40 years has meant that 
the functions of the National Police have encompassed internal security as well as normal 
policing mentioned above, and the National Police have become a vital part of 
Colombia’s security force.  The total strength of the police is estimated at around 97,000 
personnel and within there are several specialized units.  The Carabineros are specially 
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trained police that take on a variety of roles including maintenance of public order in 
urban areas, providing security along main roads and in outposts in guerrilla zones, and 
the conduct of counter insurgency missions.  The narcotics branch of the National Police 
maintains a fleet of Blackhawk helicopters and other aircraft which they use for crop 
eradication; this branch has been highly funded by the United States.  There is an anti-
kidnapping and extortion unit known as GAULA; this unit is highly trained and used for 
hostage rescue within urban areas.  Additionally, major urban areas have Transit Police 
who work for mayors in those areas but still fall under the organization of the National 
Police.  With regards to equipment, the National Police maintain helicopters, fixed wing 
aircraft and a large fleet of motor vehicles including armored personnel carriers 
(APCs).58     
B.  PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY FORCES 
The record of the Colombian security forces in the conduct of counter-insurgency 
operations against the FARC has been mixed at best, even considering the recent 
improvements in capabilities and growth.  From 1995 to 1999, the FARC was able to 
defeat the security forces utilizing large-scale ambush tactics and by conducting several 
attacks on isolated outposts. An example of this occurred in February 1998 when the 52nd 
Counter-guerrilla Battalion (BCG) of the 3rd Mobile Brigade (BRIM) was lured into a 
prepared ambush and decimated at El Billar, Caqueta.59  In August 1998, 1,200 
insurgents attacked a conscript battalion and police counter-narcotics unit located at 
Miraflores, Guaviare; the government forces suffered heavy casualties including 30 
killed, 50 wounded and more that 100 taken prisoner.  The string of defeats had the effect 
of demoralizing the Colombian security forces, but also convinced the government of the 
need to strengthen and modernize the military.  There was recognition on the part of the 
Colombian military senior officers that a modification in operational techniques and 
organizational procedures had to take place.  Operationally, they recognized that in the 
past, and during the time of the string of defeats that the military suffered at the hands of 
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the FARC, the military was operating in a counter-guerrilla mode, sending out small 
patrols from isolated outposts to attempt to disrupt guerrilla operations.  Organizationally, 
the units exposed to the fighting were more often than not conscripts.  The effect was 
doubly disadvantageous to the Colombians; poorly trained troops deployed in a fashion 
that was certain to ensure their failure.  The FARC, on the other hand, financially enabled 
by funding from drug trafficking, had gained the means to switch tactics to a more 
aggressive, mobile approach to warfare.  The FARC became much better equipped and 
subsequently gained the capability to concentrate significant troop concentrations in 
targeted areas to defeat the isolated army outposts.  As Marks states: 
The Colombian security forces were quite unprepared for this sequence of 
events after more than 3 decades of small scale, counter-guerrilla 
operations.  The police, a national organization, though roughly 100,000 
men, were spread throughout the country in small posts from which they 
engaged in the routine associated with law enforcement as opposed to 
warfare.  The armed forces, too, in their disposition, resembled the 
dispersal of the U.S. Army during the Indian Wars rather than an 
organization geared up for mobile warfare.60 
 
However, beginning in 1999, the situation began to swing back in favor of the 
army, and they improved their battlefield performance.  Operationally, the divisional 
system was shaken up and a more intensive focus was placed on instilling a combat 
posture within the five divisions with area control responsibility.  The traditional 
command structure was reorganized from the typical staff orientation (G1, G2, G3, G4, 
etc) into four directorates, Operations, Personnel, Logistics and Training.  The elite 
groups such as the Mobile Brigades (BRIMs) and Special Forces Brigade were organized 
into the Rapid Reaction Force (Fuerza de Despliegue Rapido) which was maintained in a 
sort of general support role for all divisions, falling under the direct control of the 
General Command.   Finally, a two pronged approach was taken with regards to 
addressing the main insurgent threat, the FARC.  First, troops were allocated to protect 
areas within the country that were deemed vital to national survival such as power plants 
and oil pipelines.  Second, the military moved to blunt the FARCs strategy for seizing 
power; tactics entailed cutting mobility corridors to prevent freedom of movement and 
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then going after intermediate and primary basing areas.  The new operational focus was 
on mobile warfare designed to seek out and engage the FARC.   
Organizationally, the army did away with a policy of placing conscript battalions 
in insecure areas and thus virtually ensuring their failure in combat against the FARC.  
More funding was made available to increase the conversion of conscripted soldiers into 
professional soldiers.  This was an important step as the standard term for most conscripts 
was only 1.5 years (1 year if a high school graduate), and that is too short a time period to 
train and employ a capable soldier.  With regards to equipment, although there were vast 
shortages in transportation assets, crew served weapons and communications gear, 
reallocations were made that put the right equipment in the right unit’s hands.  The focus 
was shifted to combat operations and combat units became priorities for receiving the 
gear they needed.  Key to making all the above changes was strong leadership, from the 
General Command to the Division Commanders to the Brigade Commanders.  
Shakedowns occurred at all levels and those who could not adjust to the renewed focus 
on combat operations and increased operational tempo were replaced.  General Officers 
were required to take a pledge that promised their units would be combat ready within 
three months.61  
Strong leadership was essential in bringing about changes in focus, operational 
techniques and organizational modifications.  The military was able, in a few years, to 
field a much improved force that was employed in a more suitable fashion to the new 
phase the conflict had entered.  The result was that in the three year span from 2000 to 
2003, the Army won several battles in different regions of the country that restored some 
confidence in the military’s ability to fight successfully against the FARC.62   
As of 2003, the Colombian Army is bigger, better trained, equipped and led, and 
organized more effectively than ever before.  Unfortunately, despite the recent 
improvements in mobility and capabilities, the Colombian military still has a very long 
way to go before it is capable of achieving the type of long term sustained success that is 
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necessary to win the counter-insurgency fight in Colombia.  Part C of this section will 
examine the most pronounced shortcomings of the Colombian military. 
C.   MILITARY SHORTFALLS   
The Colombian Army has no doubt progressed substantially in the few years since 
their demoralizing defeats suffered at the hands of the FARC.  Committed leadership has 
resulted in a renewed focus on effective combat operations; organizational structure and 
operational capabilities are both greatly improved.  However deficiencies remain and 
cause some doubt as to whether the army can defeat the FARC without outside 
assistance.  This section will examine potential deficiencies in the context of three areas:  
equipment, budget and manpower.    
The first area where some shortfalls may exist is in regards to military equipment.  
As mentioned in Section A, due to the nature of counter-insurgency warfare, Colombia 
has historically placed a greater emphasis on personnel levels than on military equipment.  
Under Plan Colombia, the United States provided a large amount of mobility assets in the 
form of helicopters needed to move units in a more effective and timely fashion.  Those 
assets have no doubt augmented the Colombian military’s ability to wage war against the 
guerrillas and paramilitaries.  However, Colombia has recently asked the United States 
for additional equipment to aid in the war effort.  Specifically, President Uribe requested 
that aerial platforms used to gather intelligence in the conflict with Iraq be sent to 
Colombia to aid in the fight against guerrillas and paramilitaries.63  Exactly what type of 
equipment is needed is a matter for speculation at this point, but the fact is that Colombia 
does perceive a deficiency in equipment, and the United States has taken the request 
seriously according to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.64   
A second key area is funding, and a shortfall in security force spending can be 
seen in recent defense budgets.  The military and police budget as a percentage of GDP 
did not change substantially from 1990 to 2000 despite increased aggression from the 
guerrillas, and although military expenditures were higher than average for Latin 
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America, they were still very low for a country embroiled in an active insurgency.65  As 
Figure 4 below depicts, the lack of any significant increases in defense spending prior to 
2001 (and in fact there were actually decreases) adversely affected Colombia’s ability to 
field a force capable of winning the conflict.  The Colombian military did see a change in 
the budget however, beginning with the substantial increase in 2001, which can be 
attributed primarily to U.S. funding of Plan Colombia.   More significantly, President 
Uribe announced plans in September of 2002 to increase military spending by an 
additional $1 billion a year, to be funded primarily through budget cuts and tax increases 
to be absorbed by Colombian citizens.66      
 
Defense Spending (in billions, US $) 
1997 1998 1999
2000 2001 
2.1 2.5 2.2 2.0 3.0 
 
Figure 4.  Defense Expenditure67 
The third and most significant military shortfall is manpower.  As mentioned in 
section B, the Colombian military has adopted an operational strategy of increased 
mobility to confront the FARC.  The two pronged plan includes first cutting corridors of 
mobility to prevent freedom of movement, then actively seeking out intermediate and 
main basing areas in an attempt to destroy the guerrillas in their own backyard.  Based on 
current assets and capabilities of the Colombian security forces, this is probably the only 
feasible approach to take.  However, the problem to this approach is that it does not 
address satisfactorily the need for government forces to secure and control the ground.  
Colombia is the size of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Louisiana combined, and when 
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one considers that there are only 60,000 professional soldiers available to conduct the 
fight, then it’s easy to realize that the current operational strategy is much like the “whack 
a mole” game; it engages and is able to attrit the foe, but doesn’t end the conflict as the 
enemy keeps “popping up” in another place. In other words, while the government may 
gain the initiative and inflict casualties on the FARC, ELN and AUC, the lack of ability 
to then afterward control the ground, permanently, presents a major problem.    
Colombia’s lack of ability to control the ground and restore security is directly 
related to the number and quality of security forces’ personnel.  Even with an increasing 
number of troops, the army is still lacking in the amount of properly trained personnel 
(professional soldiers) needed to fight and win a counter-insurgency war.  In any such 
type of conflict, overwhelming odds are generally considered to be necessary in order to 
be successful.  The necessity of protecting infrastructure while simultaneously 
conducting offensive combat operations takes a toll on manpower.  As Marcella states: 
Counterinsurgency wisdom suggests that Colombia needs a 10 to 1 
advantage for the armed forces to prevail over the 20,000 to 25,000 
guerrillas, plus the estimated 8,000 paramilitaries.  This would require 
tripling the size of the current armed forces which would allow the Army 
simultaneously to conduct operations against the insurgents, go after the 
drug entrepreneurs, defend infrastructure and communications, and 
establish a better presence nationwide.68 
 
Additionally, when considering military manpower shortages it is also unwise to 
ignore the possibility that the FARC may increase in size.  FARC leadership has declared 
that it has plans to increase in size to up to 30,000 within the next several years.69  If one 
is to believe the opinions on force ratios for conducting a successful counter-insurgency 
fight, approximately 300,000 professional Colombian soldiers would be needed to defeat 
a FARC that may potentially number around 30,000. Even President Uribe’s plan to 
increase the number of professional soldiers to a total of 100,000 (10,000 each year from 
2001 to 2004) will not satisfactorily address the manpower deficiency.  As noted in 
Jane’s  security  assessment  of  Colombia:  “Even if Uribe is able to enact all the reforms 
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and improvements he has proposed, the Colombian military is years away from the 
ability to take the offensive against the rebels and re-conquer territory on any significant 
scale.”70     
If there is a common theme that has led to the shortfalls in equipment, budget and 
manpower, it has been the issue of political will.  In the past, Colombia did not exhibit a 
great deal of willingness to “pay the price” in order to defeat the causes of instability and 
restore security within its borders; equipment shortfalls, insufficient budgets and lack of 
proper manpower in the military were all symptoms of a greater illness, which was 
Colombia’s unwillingness to force an end to the crisis.  However, that lack of political 
will within Colombia to properly address the conflict seems to have changed significantly 
under President Uribe’s leadership.  New changes in budgetary procedures and military 
service policy all indicate a renewed sense of commitment that the burden for the war 
will be increasingly shouldered by Colombia.  For example, the budgetary change 
announced by Uribe is telling and perhaps more significant than meets the eye.  While 
increases in defense spending since 2001 (see Figure 4) may have indicated a shift 
towards a renewed focus on the conflict, much of the 2001 increase was the result of Plan 
Colombia, with a great deal of the military budget funded by the United States.  Uribe’s 
call for the financial burden to be shared by all Colombians is a key indicator of the shift 
in political will.  Additionally, the decree recently initiated by the Ministry of Defense 
that specifies all eligible Colombians will serve in the military, regardless of social, 
economic or educational status is a significant indicator of positive change.  In the past, 
elite civilian authorities within Colombia distanced themselves from issues of national 
defense and considered combat duty suitable only for the lower class.  This attitude of the 
“rich man’s war, poor man’s fight” complex was exemplified by the 1962 law that the 
Ministry of Defense’s new decree addresses, namely that it exempted high school 
graduates, or “bachilleres” from combat.71   
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D.   A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
There is no doubt that Colombia has implemented numerous measures to improve 
its military in the form of equipment, budgetary and manpower increases.  It also seems 
clear that under President Uribe, Colombia now has the necessary political will to pursue 
a military solution to the conflict as political negotiation has proved ineffective.  Human 
rights violations by the enemies of the Colombian state and their unwillingness to 
negotiate effectively rule out peace talks as an option in the short term.  However, the 
continuing nature of the conflict and the realities of regaining and keeping control of 
territory demonstrate the still limited capability of the Colombian security forces to 
permanently restore security within the borders of the country.  It will certainly be many 
years before Colombia will have the capability for eliminating the threat posed by the 
FARC, and it is wise to keep in mind that the FARC has plans to continue to grow in 
size.  In the time it will take for the military to acquire the necessary support, capabilities 
and manpower to defeat the threat, the FARC may be able to gain in strength and/or seek 
refuge in neighboring countries.    
Perhaps in recognition of the shortcomings that the Colombian military will 
continue to deal with in the foreseeable future, President Uribe in September of 2002 
called for significant changes to the Rio Treaty in order that it might be used to address 
internal threats along with external threats.  According to Uribe, these proposed changes 
would be designed to recognize the regional threat to security posed by internal conflicts 
and drug trafficking and subsequently make it easier for neighboring countries to 
overcome issues of sovereignty and contribute to the war in Colombia.72  Uribe’s call for 
updating the Rio Treaty also serves as another indicator that the political will has shifted 
substantially in Colombia.  Previous president Andres Pastrana had, as recently as July 
2002, rejected the notion that Colombia would be amenable to a multi-national military 
force assisting his country fight its war for security.73   
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Questions remain, however, regarding the form that any potential regional 
response would take.  The conflict is characterized by violence, lack of security and 
control of territory, and illegitimate non-state actors.  Colombia’s military is faced with 
the daunting task of not only engaging guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitaries 
wherever they may exist, but also of protecting infrastructure and civilian populations.  
Lack of control over areas dominated by groups hostile to the government combined with 
a military that is still some years away from having the proper capability for solving the 
problem is at the heart of the issue.  It seems then that a feasible regional response would 
include an effort that provides both the manpower and firepower to assist Colombia in 
efforts to establish security and maintain legitimate control of it; in other words a 
coordinated, regional military effort is what is needed.  The basic concept for 
employment of such a force would be to ensure that legitimate, state sponsored control of 
territory is maintained, theoretically freeing the Colombian security forces from what is 
essentially guard duty and allowing them to focus on the conduct of combat operations, at 
least until the point that belligerents have been convinced to negotiate a peaceful 
resolution. 
In sum, Colombia has demonstrated its intention to escalate its military efforts in 
seeking to put an end to the causes of violence and insecurity within its borders.  
However, despite substantial security force increases, conventional wisdom says that 
Colombia is still years away from fielding a force capable of achieving strategic victory. 
President Uribe would seem to agree with that assessment, and he has made it clear he 
feels Colombia will require a great deal of regional assistance in achieving an end to the 
conflict.  Whether or not concrete assistance is forthcoming from neighboring countries is 
still unknown, but based on the realities of the war, it does seem clear that if the 
insurgency is to be decisively defeated and security restored in the region within a 
reasonable time period, Colombia will require military assistance from regional 
neighbors.  Each neighboring country has a vested interest in considering such a course 
of action to address the unfolding saga within Colombia, for at a minimum, Colombia’s 
plans for escalating military operations will certainly increase the spillover effect of the 
conflict.  Chapter IV will examine how Colombia’s neighbors have responded to the 
crisis and Uribe’s request for assistance.  
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IV.  THE REGIONAL RESPONSE 
Plan Colombia is a significant step in the right direction with long term goals to 
end the insurgency through a negotiated settlement and defeat the illicit drug industry 
through eradication, interdiction and alternative crop programs.  Although Colombia 
centric, the problems are in fact regional in nature and require a regional response.  
   
General Peter Pace, former Combatant Commander, U.S. Southern Command 
 
Thus far this thesis has suggested that the key to reestablishing security within 
Colombia will be the strong use of military force, above and beyond political and 
economic strategies, and argued that Colombia does not, nor will it in the near future, 
possess adequate military forces to establish the sought after security in a timely matter.  
Additionally, the gradual increase of military pressure that will characterize Colombia’s 
security force buildup and accelerated operational tempo will only provide an opportunity 
for the security problem to spread to areas considered safer by the guerrilla groups, which 
presumably are within neighboring countries.  Ironically, the importance of cooperation 
between Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama will increase even more as the 
Colombian military increases in size and capability and begins to engage the triad of 
insurgents, drug traffickers and paramilitaries aggressively; the likelihood of spillover of 
the conflict will certainly increase as Colombia attempts to ramp up military operations in 
an effort to achieve an end to the conflict.  Chapter III presented the argument that a 
regional military effort will be required in Colombia to end the conflict in the quickest 
manner possible.  President Uribe has demonstrated he has the political will to support 
such an effort and presumably each neighboring country would prefer to see a resolution 
to the conflict as soon as possible.  The question then becomes what has the response to 
the conflict been thus far from neighboring countries, and how agreeable would they be 
to any cooperative military effort to solve the crisis in Colombia? 
This chapter will explore the reactions to the crisis in Colombia on an individual 
country basis, the history of regional cooperative efforts, and recent developments in 
regards to cooperative efforts that address the crisis.  The first section examines what the 
individual responses have been from Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama.   
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A.   THE INDIVIDUAL CASES 
Individually, the countries bordering Colombia recognize the serious nature of the 
crisis and the potential for spillover into their respective borders.  Each has been affected 
by the conflict to a certain degree, however, reactions to the crisis from each country 
have been mixed with each country responding differently to the threat.  Some have 
reacted favorably to the level of U.S. involvement through Plan Colombia and have 
sought out closer ties to the United States, while some have seemed resentful of the U.S. 
position and taken actions to distance themselves accordingly.  Other neighboring 
countries have taken no significant action or have attempted to ignore the problem 
altogether.  In addition to reactions to the level of U.S. involvement as a result of Plan 
Colombia, internal politics and economic problems have also shaped responses to a great 
degree.  Brazil and Peru seem to take a hard line, “no nonsense” approach to the problem; 
Ecuador and Panama have taken a much more passive approach, while the form of the 
Venezuelan response remains hard to determine and predict.  This section will examine 
what the reaction has been for each neighboring country, in turn examining Brazil, 
Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama.   
Brazil has been very concerned about potential spillover problems from the 
Colombian crisis and has paid close attention to cross-border incursions by drug 
traffickers and the guerrilla groups.  The Brazilians have taken an active stance in 
stepping up military and police presence along the border and actively seek out and 
destroy trafficking and insurgent incursions when they become visible.  The concern and 
subsequent response centers on the fact that the FARC and narco-traffickers have been 
active in Brazil’s border regions for years, and their presence signifies a threat to the 
national interests of the country, specifically control over the vast Amazonian rain forest.   
The concern over protecting the sovereignty of the rain forest was noted by 
President Cardoso in November 1996, when at the end of the second year of his 
presidency he announced the promulgation of the "National Defense Policy" (PDN).  The 
document was a first in Brazil’s history, but what is notable is that in his announcement 
of the new policy, Cardoso spoke of the Amazon region as the major strategic priority of 
his government, and referred to "armed bands who operate in neighboring countries, on 
the border of Brazilian Amazonia," and to "international organized crime" as "some of 
40 
the concerns that should draw the attention of the strategies that come out of this defense 
policy."74  In fact, the vast forested areas in the country have made Brazil a prime transit 
state for drugs moving to the United States.  Additionally, since Brazil is a key supplier 
of many of the chemicals used in cocaine processing, its extensive river system is ideal 
for shipment of the kerosene, sulfuric acid and acetone needed to refine cocaine.   
FARC operations particularly within Brazil have caused a reaction from the 
Brazilian government.  In September of 1996, the Brazilian army went on full alert in 
reaction to reports that FARC elements had crossed the border into Brazil; more than 
1,000 soldiers deployed to the area to maintain a guard on the border and installations.75  
In 1999, the Brazilians gathered intelligence that indicated the FARC would attempt to 
seize a Brazilian Army airfield in an attempt to prevent Colombian military forces from 
using it to conduct operations against the FARC around Mitu, Colombia.  A Brazilian 
special operations force of around 250 personnel pre-empted the FARC by conducting an 
operation to secure the airfield, and 5,000 regular soldiers reinforced that area of the 
border to deter any other attacks in that region. Beginning in September of 1999, 
Operation Cobra increased the federal police force in one area of the border from 20 law 
enforcement officials to 180 and equipped them with patrol boats, airplanes and a 
helicopter.76  Seven bases were set up along the 1,020 mile border with Colombia, 
including one on each of the four rivers that flows from Colombia into Brazil, in an effort 
to heighten vigilance along the frontier area.77  Brazil now maintains around 22,000 
troops on the Colombian border to defend the frontier regions against incursions by 
FARC and narco-traffickers.   
In general, Brazil’s concern for the amount of narco-trafficking and insurgent 
activity within its borders and subsequent threat posed by these forces has resulted in a 
revitalized government presence along the border with Colombia.  The increase in 
military and law enforcement presence along the Colombian border is further bolstered 
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by the emergence of the Brazilian Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM), the key 
components of which are 19 fixed and six mobile radars intended to detect low-flying 
aircraft in Brazil.78   In addition to controlling airspace and helping to defend the porous 
borders of the country, the concept of SIVAM is to protect against weather hazards, 
jungle fires and criminal activities, specifically to protect the treasured rain forests of the 
Amazon.  Interestingly, even with the increase in military forces in the border region, the 
Brazilians seem to view spillover effects as a criminal activity, and the containment of 
those effects to be a police function.  In characterizing the increased militarization of the 
border area, former President Cardoso was quoted as saying:  “the Armed Forces are not 
to be used on an everyday basis in these battles, except to support the police.”79   
While Brazil has cooperated to a small degree with the Colombians in the past to 
stymie insurgent and narco-trafficking activities, the overall response from the 
government seems to remain focused on two issues:  1.) Preserving the sovereignty of 
Brazil’s border above other considerations; and 2.) Remaining neutral with regards to the 
conflict in order to preserve a role for itself as mediator in any future peace process.  
Brazil’s stance was stated clearly in 2000 by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luiz 
Felipe Lampreia, who asserted that ''Brazil is not willing to send units of the army or the 
police to fight alongside their Colombian counterparts, whether against the guerrillas or 
narcotics traffickers''.  He added that any additional dispatch of troops that may occur will 
be intended exclusively ''to strengthen our military presence on the border in order to 
defend and safeguard our frontier.''80   
Brazil’s stance under newly elected President Luiz Inacio Lula de Silva does not 
appear likely to change drastically.  Brazil, along with Venezuela and Ecuador, recently 
rejected Colombian President Uribe’s request for neighboring countries to declare the 
FARC a terrorist organization, which under United Nations antiterrorism Resolution 
1373 would allow the FARC’s financial assets to be frozen and FARC members denied 
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asylum in neighboring countries.81  While Brazil has taken a tough, no-nonsense 
approach toward containing the problem of narco-traffickers and guerrilla groups, its 
response has centered on maintaining the sovereignty of its borders while remaining 
neutral to the parties at conflict within Colombia.  In Brazil’s view, the potential of 
playing the role of mediator in any future peace talks is considered a long term advantage 
of this strategy. 
In Venezuela, the border region with Colombia is an area where a significant 
amount of spillover activity has taken place over the years.  FARC, ELN and paramilitary 
units routinely move across the border to attack one another and exploit the civilian 
population in the quest for seeking advantage in the drug and arms trades.82  The 
paramilitaries attack the guerilla groups and the civilian work force that the guerillas use 
to produce drug products that ultimately sustain its force.  Additionally, the FARC and 
ELN engage in kidnapping and extortion, aimed mainly at wealthy Venezuelan ranchers.  
The result has been a large influx of refugees from Colombia, civilians seeking a safer 
area to live within the borders of Venezuela.   
In response, the Venezuelan government acknowledged the critical nature of the 
situation, although two radically different approaches have been taken: the pre-Chavez 
and post-Chavez responses.  In the 1990’s Venezuela began to be increasingly concerned 
with the situation in Colombia and built up greater troop strength along its border to deal 
with the insurgents.  Resulting clashes between the Venezuelan military and the FARC 
expanded the refugee problem and displaced persons crossed the border in larger 
numbers; by 1998, there were approximately 3 million Colombians living in Venezuela.  
For example, the city of Machiques in Venezuela is made up of roughly 80 percent 
Colombian residents.  The dramatic increase in Colombian refugees seeking asylum from 
the conflict was viewed as a major threat to Venezuelan sovereignty and, in reaction, the 
Venezuelan military stepped up efforts to coordinate actions with the Colombian military.  
Interestingly, the Venezuelan lack of support for and policy of returning refugees and 
displaced persons to Colombia seems to play into the hands of the FARC by delivering 
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the labor necessary for the cultivation of coca.  Social programs were also initiated in the 
border region as a measure against insurgent incursions into Venezuela.   
The Venezuelan reaction changed somewhat when Hugo Chavez took office in 
1999.  At the beginning of his term, Chavez declared that he was “neutral” with regards 
to the conflict, and many believed that this was an indication he planned to recognize the 
FARC politically.83  To date that has not happened, but Chavez has long been critical of 
Plan Colombia, stating that the large amount of U.S. support to the plan would lead to 
even greater conflict among the combatants in Colombia’s war, thus causing increased 
problems in Venezuela.84  Thus, instead of increasing bilateral cooperation, Venezuela 
seemed to foster a somewhat confrontational stance towards Colombia.  In October of 
2000, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jose Vincente Rangel asked the Colombian 
government to improve its level of border security, blaming Plan Colombia for the 
increased level of violence along the border region.85  The amount of cooperation 
between Colombia and Venezuela declined sharply as Colombia became suspicious of 
Chavez’s intentions; relations soured between the countries amidst allegations that 
Chavez was sympathetic to the FARC.  Chavez has consistently refused to categorize 
either the FARC or ELN as enemies of Venezuela, maintaining instead that Venezuela 
should maintain its distance in the conflict in order to be an effective promoter of peace.  
Some political observers categorized this stance as a political-diplomatic victory for the 
guerrilla groups.86  More incriminating evidence of Chavez’s alleged support for the 
guerrillas came directly from those groups themselves.  In September of 2000, 
spokespersons for the FARC and ELN came forth with statements that seemed to imply 
Chavez’s administration was, at the very least, relatively uninterested in maintaining 
solidarity with the Colombian government: 
Recently, a senior ELN commander said his group was respecting its 
"agreements" with the Venezuelan government, which quickly denied the 
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existence of any such accord. Ruben Zamora, the FARC commander in 
Catatumbo region, says there has been a "change of attitude" on the part of 
the Venezuelan armed forces since Mr. Chavez came to power, but he too 
denies the existence of any formal agreement.87  
 
More recently, the Venezuelan military has been accused of directly supporting 
the Colombian guerrillas.  In March 2003, in an incident characteristic of the complicated 
nature of the conflict, Colombian villagers under the protection of paramilitary forces 
reported that FARC units attacked their hamlet of Monte Adentro from staging areas in 
Venezuela, and that Venezuelan aircraft bombed the paramilitary positions in 
Colombia.88  Chavez acknowledged the bombing, however, he maintained that the 
incident took place within Venezuela territory.  Colombian military officers have long 
maintained that the FARC uses Venezuela as a staging area to conduct military strikes 
from a protected refuge.  Venezuela has officially disputed that claim, maintaining 
instead that Colombia has allowed paramilitary forces to operate with impunity in the 
region.  Despite this, they have refused Colombian requests to pursue guerrilla units into 
Venezuela.89           
 The reaction of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez to the Colombian crisis remains 
hard to quantify.  Chavez probably desires to strengthen his position as a regional leader 
without compromising his support from the left; this may be reflected in his desire to 
appear to remain neutral with regards to the conflict.  Still, his true motivations are hard 
to determine.  The political situation in Venezuela is so polarized that even accusations 
by members of his own military about his complicity with Colombian guerrillas must be 
viewed critically.90  Regardless, the Chavez administration remains firmly critical of Plan 
Colombia and as such, it seems unlikely that any great deal of cooperation between 
Venezuela and Colombia in dealing with the crisis will evolve anytime soon, although it 
is possible that a new administration in Venezuela in the near future may change that 
outlook.           
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 In recent years, Peru has generally sought to confront directly the problems 
brought about by the conflict in Colombia. A strong military that was effective in 
decisively attacking Peru’s own insurgent organizations, the Shining Path-Sendero 
Luminoso and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, remained ready to handle any 
major Colombian guerrilla incursion.  Under President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), the 
stance of Peru was very much hard-line.  Fujimori made clear his willingness to utilize 
Peruvian military forces to combat the FARC, strengthened his forces along the border, 
called for a war “without concessions” on the FARC, and authorized cooperative efforts 
between the Peruvian and Colombian militaries to exchange intelligence and coordinate 
efforts.91  In fighting its own insurgency, the military under Fujimori was given free reign 
to put down the Shining Path organization that had terrorized Peru for more than a decade 
in a conflict that left more than 25,000 people dead.92  In addition to Fujimori’s tough 
stance, the extreme geography of the border region between Colombia and Peru helped to 
contain the impact of the Colombian crisis on Peru.  Much of the 1,000 mile border 
encompasses an area of dense jungle, extremely remote and uninhabited, that is generally 
considered to be incapable of supporting insurgent military operations.    
 While the terrain remains the same, Peru’s position under President Alejandro 
Toledo (2001-present) has not.  Elected following the arms trafficking scandal that 
helped to bring down Fujimori’s administration, Toledo’s goal of creating a more open, 
responsive democracy has included attempts to bring the Peruvian military back into the 
fold of increased civilian control.  Through budget cuts and criticism of past tactics, 
Toledo has attempted to reform a military that owed much of its power to Fujimori.  The 
budget was cut some 15 percent to pay for social programs, and Toledo has been publicly 
critical of the brutal, if successful, tactics used by government forces to end the guerrilla 
movement.  Further, hundreds of officers have been cashiered, including three general 
officers who previously made up the joint chiefs of staff, but were implicated in 
Fujimori-era corruption scandals.93        
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 Toledo’s attempts to reform the military have most likely resulted in a weakening 
of Peru’s security posture.  Although Peru and Colombia have continued to pledge 
mutual cooperation, Toledo’s actions with regards to the military probably had the 
unintended consequence of a less active stance with regards to the crisis from Peru.  
Personnel cuts and budget reductions have led to decreased morale in the military.  The 
unfortunate result may be an increase in FARC activities along the border and into Peru.  
Despite Peruvian Defense Minister Walter Ledesma’s claim that the border was peaceful, 
the government reinforced the border area in February of 2001.  Further, the Colombian 
government has maintained that the FARC are increasingly crossing into Peru, and in 
January of 2002, Newsweek published a story that alleged the FARC was operating 
within Peru, an allegation that the FARC did not dispute except to say it was on a 
temporary basis.94  Although continuing to deny an increased FARC presence in Peru, 
President Toledo stated in March 2002 that as a precaution he had moved military bases 
from the border of Ecuador to the border of Colombia.95       
 The increase in FARC activity seems to coincide with a rising level of activity 
from Shining Path and other, smaller revolutionary groups within Peru.  In 2002, there 
were reports of Shining Path rebels skirmishing with Peruvian Army and police units and, 
more  ominously, that former commanders of Peru's smaller, urban-based Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement were seen leaving the country in early November with a FARC 
column, apparently for consultations with guerrilla chieftains in Colombia.96    
 Peru’s response to the crisis in Colombia has been determined to a great extent by 
the character of the administration in power.  Under Fujimori, it was one of a tough, no-
nonsense approach, stemming perhaps from Peru’s own successful experience fighting its 
own insurgency.  It is probably accurate to say that as a result of Fujimori’s strong 
approach and cooperative efforts between Colombia and Peru, the severity of the 
spillover from the conflict was minimized.  And while cooperation between the Peruvian 
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and Colombian militaries has remained good, Peru’s stance under Toledo has softened, at 
least in the initial stages of his presidency.  His efforts to bring the free wheeling military 
more under the control of civilian power has resulted in decreased morale and 
effectiveness.  This has apparently contributed to increased insurgent activity, both 
emanating from Colombia and from within Peru itself.  Conversely, Peru under Toledo 
remains fully supportive of Plan Colombia.  The cooperation is helped no doubt by 
planned increases in U.S. counter drug assistance to Peru, with planned funding being 
tripled to 150 million dollars.97       
 In Ecuador, in contrast, the response to the Colombian crisis has been 
characterized overall by a desire to remain neutral, albeit with a resigned willingness to 
become more engaged should the dynamics of the conflict be forced upon the country.  
Political and economic instability and a rather weak security capability are probably 
contributing factors to Ecuador’s reluctance to side with the Colombian government.  
Ecuador is handicapped by a foreign debt that makes up 40 percent of the national budget 
and a political situation in which the country has seen five presidents in as many years.98  
And, while the army is popular with the rural population and seen as a source of stability, 
it is doubtful whether it has the capability to confront experienced Colombian insurgents 
effectively. 
 Ecuador’s desire to maintain a neutral stance is reflected in the recent decision, 
taken along with Venezuela and Brazil, to avoid declaring the leftist guerrillas and right-
wing paramilitaries in Colombia terrorist organizations.  Presumably this position stems 
from a desire to help negotiate a peaceful solution, although some sources indicate that 
the decision is predicated more on a fear of becoming further involved in what may be 
viewed as a sovereignty issue.  An Ecuadorian military officer was recently quoted as 
saying that Ecuador would not declare Colombia’s insurgents “terrorists” because that 
would amount to “an indirect intervention in the conflict” in that country, which “the 
                                                 
97 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush Vows to Help Peru Fight Rebels and Keep Andes Region Stable,”   
New York Times, 24 March, 2002 
98 William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threats to Regional Security,” Military Review,  (May/June 
2001) p. 10 
48 
Ecuadorian armed forces are not willing to get involved in.”99      
 While Ecuador would prefer to remain neutral, it has taken several steps that seem 
to indicate willingness, however tentative, to undertake measures to blunt the effects of 
potential spillover.  Despite the political, economic and security concerns mentioned 
above, Ecuador has attempted to maintain some semblance of initiative by addressing the 
spillover issues in several key areas.  Beginning in 1999, the military began to step up 
patrols in the border region in reaction to suspected FARC cross border activity.  When 
FARC activity increased in 2000, Ecuador’s Foreign Minister, Heinz Moeller, stated that 
“We don’t want anything to do with the internal Colombian conflict other than to see a 
negotiated peace, but if we are left with no alternative we will have to confront them 
militarily.”100  In response to a further deterioration since that time, Ecuador has assigned  
even more personnel to the border; 6,000 additional troops were recently moved to the 
region.101  And in March 2002, Vice President Pedro Pinto said he would ask for 
additional funding from the U.S. to help strengthen its northern border with Colombia.102  
To address the increased refugee flows, Ecuador has lobbied for additional funding from 
outside sources, namely through efforts to work with the UNHCR and an initiative to 
create an asylum policy that is supportive of displaced persons from the border region.  
Additionally, Ecuador established a 10 year agreement with the United States to allow a 
forward operating base in Manta; from the base, military surveillance aircraft will operate 
in order to detect aircraft engaged in drug trafficking operations.  
 Despite Ecuador’s directed efforts at restoring security, Colombian guerrilla 
groups and paramilitaries have continued to operate openly in the border region and the 
refugee problem remains a major issue.  Justifiably, Ecuador’s concern about an 
escalation of the conflict is attributed to fears that future military effort by Colombia 
against guerrillas will result in even more rebel incursions and an even larger refugee 
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crisis, issues they are reluctant to face given their internal problems.  Ecuador’s efforts to 
maintain some degree of initiative have been somewhat effective as short term solutions 
to the problem, yet it would seem that by attempting to maintain neutrality Ecuador is 
failing to directly address the inevitable increase in problems that more aggressive 
Colombian military efforts will bring.  A neutral stance will most likely result only in a 
continuation of semi-effective measures that address symptoms, highlighting the 
necessity for renewed cooperation with Colombia and the other nations in the region to 
address the root cause.           
 In Panama, officials have tended to downplay the potential gravity of any crisis 
spillover, however, of all the countries bordering Colombia, Panama probably faces the 
greatest threat, primarily because the country is so weak politically and militarily.  
Panama has the poorest capability for providing any type of security against insurgent 
and narco-trafficker incursions originating from Colombia because it has not had a 
military since 1989 and does not maintain the capability for performing counter-
insurgency or counter-drug missions.  The country does maintain a Border Police Service 
with more than 2,000 personnel stationed along the border with Colombia, but it is not 
organized or equipped to deal with the insurgent threat presented by the Colombian crisis. 
The political situation is not much brighter.  Under President Mireya Moscoso, who came 
into power in 1999, Panama has chosen to stick its head in the sand with regards to the 
spillover effect.  The administration did little to attempt to establish control over the 
Darien province region bordering Colombia.  Incredibly, Panamanian Public Force units 
in the Darien were actually encouraged to avoid contact with Colombian insurgent groups 
operating in Panama.103          
 The combination of a non-existent military capability and a weak political stance 
have exacerbated the porous nature of the Panamanian border and allowed the FARC to 
seek shelter freely in the Darien, both for rest and for establishing an avenue to receive 
supplies originating from other Central American countries.  Panamanian authorities have 
routinely discovered arms shipments bound for Colombia.  One such shipment, seized in 
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the fall of 2000, was the largest in the nation's history and included 271 AK-47 assault 
rifles, 318 grenade launchers, 73,000 rounds of ammunition and more than a ton of 
TNT.104  Other caches have included cocaine, which the police believe was in partial 
payment for the weapons.  The inevitable resulting engagements between the FARC and 
paramilitaries who actively pursued them into Panama to disrupt their activities have 
resulted in threats to Panamanian citizens and increased refugee flows from Colombia 
into Panama.  Death threats forced a Roman Catholic bishop to flee into exile last year 
after he publicly denounced incursions by both the rebels and the paramilitaries.105  The 
situation in Panama really is a paradigm for what will happen in the region if a strong 
coordinated regional response is not undertaken soon.  Panama’s “ostrich approach” has 
allowed the conflict to spill over into Panamanian territory and therefore negatively 
impact the security of Panamanian citizens.  
B.  OBSTACLES TO A COOPERATIVE RESPONSE 
We know full well that the driving force should be Colombian and will continue to 
be Colombian.  Do not ask us to interfere – it isn’t our style… 
 
Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, July, 2002 
 
It is apparent from Part A that the responses to the threat of instability brought 
about by the Colombian crisis have differed remarkably from country to country and 
from administration to administration, running the gamut from aggressive confrontation 
to denial to alleged support of the guerrilla groups.  However, despite the variations in 
responses from individual countries, what they all do seem to have in common (with 
perhaps the exception of Panama) is an increasing awareness of the gravity of the 
situation in Colombia as the conflict has escalated there and increased the danger of 
spillover.  Despite this shared awareness, however, there seems to be reluctance to 
develop a comprehensive regional strategy to deal with the problem.  In fact, the regional 
reaction can be characterized by two common courses of action: bilateral efforts between 
Colombia and its neighbors that seem to address the symptoms of the conflict, namely 
increased refugee flow, cross border guerrilla and paramilitary activity, and illicit drug 
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activity; and rhetoric espousing the necessity and willingness for regional cooperation 
that has yet to evolve into any substantial effort.   
This section explores the reasons behind the lack of substantial regional response.  
In doing so, it attempts to answer why the involved countries have demonstrated little 
ability to work together to confront the threat in Colombia.  It argues that there are four 
main casual factors at the heart of the issue:   1) Traditional Latin American views on the 
value of sovereignty; 2.) Internal political and economic problems that keep a nation’s 
focus inward; 3.) The extensive U.S. involvement in the Colombia crisis; and 4.) Lack of 
precedent for the type of conflict taking place in Colombia and the subsequent threat that 
any potential spillover poses.     
One reason for the lack of regional focus in solving the Colombian problem is the 
traditional Latin American views on state sovereignty.  From Colombia’s standpoint, at 
least prior to President Uribe, beyond intensifying restrictions on the trafficking of arms 
and chemicals for drug production, there has been no desire in the past to have 
neighboring nations become involved in the conflict, and hence no requests for any such 
type of assistance.  Similarly, due to the high priority placed on state sovereignty, 
nationalism and non-intervention, multilateral approaches to problem solving tend to be 
few and far between in the region.  In fact, most Latin American states have made non-
intervention in the internal affairs of other Latin American nations a keystone of foreign 
policy.  The concept of non-intervention seems to have originated in the early part of the 
20th Century, and it was, as Millett explains: 
First given concrete expression by Argentine Foreign Minister Luis M. 
Drago in 1902, this became a central tenant of regional policy, especially 
as it was directed against interventions in the Caribbean Basin by the 
United States.  Mexico joined Argentina as a leading proponent of this 
principle and, with support from other nations, they made non-intervention 
a dominant theme at the International Conferences of American States.106  
 
Since that time, non-intervention has remained a key part of most official policies of 
Latin American countries and the record for collective problem solving has been almost 
non existent.  The Organization of American States (OAS) has long espoused the ideal of 
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democracy promotion, but the organization has placed an even higher premium on the 
principles of non-intervention and respect for a state-centric notion of sovereignty.107   
However, while the general principle of non-intervention has endured for some 
time, there have been a number of cautious exceptions in the region.  States, while 
hesitant to tamper with prohibition of intervention, have at least been more cognizant of 
the legal grounds to act collectively and utilize regional, and especially international 
organizations as a means to achieve national ends.  The 1991 Santiago Declaration 
obligated member governments of the OAS to consult on actions to reverse or punish 
coups against democratically elected governments, and the Inter-American Democracy 
Charter that was signed by Colin Powell for the United States on September 11, 2001, is 
one of a number of new international instruments giving democratic standards substance 
as a tool to combat anti-democratic processes in the region.108  And it seems that it is the 
legal credibility provided by international or regional organizations that makes the 
difference in countries willingness to intervene.  As Fernando Teson puts forth: 
Yet the principles and policies that govern unilateral intervention differ 
substantially from those that govern collective intervention, especially 
intervention authorized by international organizations such as the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States.109  
 
Indeed, the OAS has attempted to intervene, politically, and only to a certain 
degree, a number of times in the name of supporting democracy within the region.  The 
OAS involved itself in Panama in 1989, in Haiti in 1991, in Paraguay in 1996, in Peru in 
2000, and most recently in Venezuela in 2002.  In each case the OAS involvement was 
predicated on the desire to defend and consolidate democracy and thus given precedent 
under formal declarations.  Granted, the degree and efficacy of each of those cases of 
involvement is debatable, but the fact that they occurred at all may signal a shift away 
from the prohibition on intervention.  However, it is also important to note the conditions 
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under which those collective interventions occurred, for in each case they were in 
reaction to attempted coups against democratically elected governments.   Since such a 
coup attempt is unlikely to occur in Colombia, it is necessary to consider the willingness 
of Latin American countries to intervene in a country dealing with an internal insurgency. 
 In contrast, the Contadora Group’s intervention into the Central American conflict 
in the 1980’s was a diplomatic effort aimed at resolving the insurgencies being waged in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Nicaragua was aiding Salvadoran rebels and the United 
States organized and supported the “Contras” operations into Nicaragua from Honduras.  
The dynamics of the insurgency were extremely complex, and the fear in the region was 
an escalation of conflict that would drag Honduras into the conflict.  OAS efforts at 
negotiating a peace met with resistance; Nicaragua preferred not to have the OAS broker 
a peace deal as the Sandinistas believed the organization was dominated by U.S. interests, 
while El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras did prefer OAS involvement.  As a 
diplomatic alternative to end the conflict, the Contadora Group was created in January 
1983 at the initiative of Colombian President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986).110  The 
core countries of the group, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico aimed to fill the 
diplomatic vacuum created by perceptions of the belligerent nations about the objectivity 
of the OAS.  While it failed to directly produce a peace treaty, instead giving way to 
peace proposals by Costa Rican President Arias and direct negotiations between the 
countries, the Contadora Group initiative was ultimately a key first step in the process of 
bringing about an effectively brokered peace in the region.  The OAS eventually 
supervised elections and the demobilization of the military in Nicaragua.111  The 
Contadora Group ultimately expanded and is now the Rio Group, including Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Guyana in addition to the 
original four members.112 
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In sum, while the policy of non-intervention has more or less continued to this 
day based on long established beliefs on sovereignty, there is precedence to indicate that 
a willingness exists on the part of Latin Americans to tolerate collective intervention in 
certain cases and thus work together to protect democracy or establish peace regionally.  
That willingness to tolerate collective action has been based in legal precedent 
established by OAS charter and has most recently been directed in reaction to coups 
against democratically elected governments.  Earlier, concern about the spillover effects 
of the conflicts within Nicaragua and El Salvador prompted collective action on the part 
of the Contadora Group in an attempt to establish peace in the region.   These examples 
point to the possibility for a regional cooperative effort in the Colombian case.     
The second issue holding back any semblance of regional partnership in the fight 
against the security threat posed by the crisis in Colombia is the volatile nature of internal 
political and economic situations within a number of the countries most directly 
threatened.  Difficulties in adjusting to globalization have destabilized institutions to a 
degree and subsequently given birth to political dilemmas that require a focus on internal 
issues; strategic issues of regional security take a back seat by necessity.  As 
globalization undermines the degree of national sovereignty, nations have typically found 
it difficult to undertake policy or formulate strategies that would seemingly further 
undermine a sense of national identity.  The seriousness of the economic situations and 
divisive politics present in most of Colombia’s neighbors have the cumulative effect of 
diluting any unity of effort, both within each of those nations and collectively with 
regards to the threat form the crisis in Colombia.  Any attempts at regional unity, 
especially with regards to a regional security issue, are sabotaged by this phenomenon.  
 The political situation in Peru is an excellent example.  Even after establishing an 
excellent record in combating insurgency and drug-trafficking in the 1990’s, the Fujimori 
government imploded after the alleged involvement of the President’s political associate 
and director of national intelligence in arms trafficking and sales to Colombian guerillas.  
The event triggered a collapse of what had been a strong consensus among the ruling 
political and military elites in the state in dealing with the Colombian crisis and 
insurgency.  President Toledo’s attempts to reform the military have led to lowered 
morale within the security forces and decreased effectiveness.  Economic problems also 
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distract Peru’s attention from the crisis in Colombia.  The Peruvian economy has been in 
recession for the greater part of five years, with the gross domestic product around $55 
billion and exports at just $6 billion.113  Such economic difficulties have taken the focus 
of President Toledo’s administration away from security issues related to the Colombian 
crisis.             
 In Ecuador, a number of international and domestic factors led to crises.  The 
government’s attempts to stabilize the economy took center stage as the government 
attempted to “dollarize” the economy.  The political and economic difficulties were so 
bad during the 1999-2000 time span that fully 4 percent (500,000) of the population left 
the country.114  Ecuador had little capacity to respond to the crisis in Colombia and has 
sought to maintain neutrality vice seek a regionally agreed upon course of action.  With 
these examples of divisiveness and domestic distraction, it’s not hard to imagine the 
difficulties that need to be overcome in internal political matters before a united regional 
stance can even be considered.                                                                
The third factor to consider for an explanation of the lack of a collective effort is 
the high level of U.S. involvement in the crisis.  The United States has been actively 
involved in Colombia for a number of years, and Plan Colombia is the most recognizable 
example of U.S. influence in helping Colombia shape a response to the threat.  But 
extensive U.S. involvement has not prompted a more robust regional response.  If 
anything, it can be argued that U.S. involvement in Colombia has had an extremely 
negative effect on any hopes for regional cooperation.  There are a number of reasons to 
explain this, beginning with the history of past United States involvement in Latin 
American affairs, which was often in the form of heavy handed intervention.  Beginning 
in the early 1800’s, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked numerous times in attempt to keep 
Europe out of hemispheric affairs.115  During the Cold War, the United States intervened 
numerous times in the internal affairs of countries in the region, this time to prevent the 
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proliferation of communism in Latin America.  Because of historical precedence, Latin 
American leaders may have a tendency to disregard a policy measure precisely because 
of U.S. association.  As Tom Farer states: 
Ambivalence stemmed as well from the history of U.S. intervention in 
Latin states in the name of promoting democratic values.  Linking 
democracy and security threatened to provide the hemispheric superpower 
with a normative fig leaf for the pursuit of parochial ends by essentially 
unilateral means.116   
 
Put simply, the national and regional views of many Latin American countries 
may be influenced to a great degree by a resentment of possible U.S. intervention.117  A 
specific example of this fear comes from Brazil, where concern has arisen that the United 
States intends to establish a military presence in the Amazon, and involvement in 
Colombia is the conduit to achieve that objective.118  Whether due to suspicion or 
resentment of past interventions, the fact that the United States is heavily involved in the 
Colombian crisis may partly handicap any attempts to establish a regional coalition to 
deal with the problem.       
The fourth reason for the lack of a cooperative effort is the absence of a precedent 
in Latin America for an alliance to deal with the type of threat faced in Colombia. 
Simply, there hasn’t been an internal conflict in a Latin America country that has posed 
such a direct threat to an entire region and hence presented the necessity for a cooperative 
effort. With the exception of what occurred in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s, 
which took place in the context of the Cold War and could arguably be labeled inter-state 
in nature, internal civil wars have rarely posed a threat to neighboring countries to the 
degree seen in Colombia.  However, system type conflicts, which Wolf Grabendorff 
describes as arising between ideological differences between two states, have resulted in 
cooperative security efforts.119  The obvious system conflict was the Cold War, and for 
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Latin America, the collective security arrangement within the region was based within an 
anti-communist ideology led by the United States.  The U.S. sponsored security regime 
within Latin America was formalized by the creation of international coordinating 
organizations, such as the OAS and procedures established by treaties, such as the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance or Rio Treaty.120  The Rio Treaty declared that 
any external attack on any member country would be considered an attack on all. With 
the end of the Cold War, the framework for the usefulness of such treaties with regards to 
collective security disappeared.  And while the Rio Treaty may have given Latin 
American states the latitude to act collectively in defense of democracy, the obvious 
difference is that it was oriented toward an external threat from outside the region, 
namely the Soviet Union. Additionally, in light of the fact that the Rio Treaty was never 
invoked even in the face of a number of internally toppled democracies, it can be argued 
that member states of the OAS never ceased placing a higher emphasis on sovereignty 
than on the protection of democracy.121  In sum, the current situation in Colombia poses a 
unique threat to the region, the character of which has not been seen before in Latin 
America, and there has been little incentive to form a collective security response in the 
region.  
To date, no coherent strategy or cooperative security effort exists in Latin 
America to address the very real, region-wide threats posed by the Colombian crisis.  
After nearly three decades of conflict that has increasingly affected neighboring states, 
there hasn’t been one tangible regional response presented, much less initiated.  Section 
C of this chapter will consider whether or not attitudes of the key Latin American actors 
affected by the crisis are changing with regards to cooperation, and how any such change 
may make a coordinated regional effort a plausible form of future response.       
C.   RECENT ADVANCES IN COOPERATION 
All the nations surrounding Colombia have been affected to so some degree by 
the crisis there, and all fear an escalation of the conflict.  However, as noted in Section B, 
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there is no existing consensus on how to address the issue from a regional perspective.  It 
can be argued that of all the countries affected, none (perhaps with the exception of 
Brazil) have developed any coherent individual strategy for dealing with the crisis.  
Ambiguity and divisiveness have characterized the country responses to the problem; 
clearly defined goals and cooperation have been rare commodities.  Whether or not this 
passive stance is due to any combination of the factors mentioned in Section B is, of 
course, debatable, but there can be no arguing the fact that up until now the countries 
most directly affected by the crisis have contributed very little in reaching a solution.  
Whether due to respect for sovereignty, internal dilemmas, or the unprecedented nature of 
the conflict, the perception is that the majority of Latin American nations have been 
content to “sit on the sidelines” and allow the United States to be the major contributor in 
efforts to help Colombia restore stability within its borders.  However, there is evidence 
that the approach taken thus far in the region may be changing.  This section will 
examine how attitudes towards a more active collective solution may be evolving, and 
how such changes may lead to the introduction of a regional military cooperative effort in 
response to the crisis in Colombia.  
Recent events in the region seem to indicate that a shift is occurring in the long 
established policy of non-intervention and lack of participation towards the conflict in 
Colombia, and that there is greater reception towards implementation of collective 
security measures.  After deploying thousands of troops to the border in 2000, Hugo 
Chavez showed some willingness to cooperate more effectively and to at least consider a 
unified regional stance.  As Judith Gentlemen notes: 
In an early sign of what would later come to be a willingness to cooperate 
on a regional basis, however, Chavez also floated a trial balloon proposing 
that South American states form a NATO-like military alliance to deal 
with regional problems…122 
 
In September of 2002, Colombia, for the first time, asked for assistance from 
other Latin American nations to help it in its fight.  President Uribe’s call for significant 
changes to the Rio Treaty to recognize the regional threat to security posed by internal 
conflicts would presumably make it easier for neighboring countries to overcome issues 
                                                 
122Judith A. Gentlemen, “The Regional Security Crisis In the Andes: Patterns of State Response,” 
Implementing Plan Colombia Series (The North South Center and Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001) pp 
15-16  
59 
of sovereignty and collectively assist Colombia through “concrete efforts” in the 
conflict.123   Uribe’s call for assistance seems to have had some effect.   Many Latin 
American diplomats have probably realized for some time that they cannot continue to 
ignore the crisis or pretend that it is Colombia’s problem alone, and more recently they 
have started to make these sentiments public.   In December of 2002, Chilean President 
Ricardo Lagos called on nations within Latin America to work together to help Colombia 
solve the current crisis.  According to Lagos, “Colombia’s success will be the success of 
Latin America.  We should all assume our responsibilities.”124  Ecuador and Colombia 
have begun working on a common security agenda that will entail reinforcing patrols and 
improving control procedures along their mutual border.  In January 2003, Colombia’s 
Defense Minister Martha Lucia Ramirez told reporters that representatives from both 
countries would soon meet to discuss improving bilateral security measures in an effort to 
better secure the common border region.125  And in March 2003, Brazilian President Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva promised President Uribe help in detecting drug traffickers and 
leftist guerrillas that operate along the Brazil-Colombia border.  Reportedly, the Lula 
administration offered Colombia use of the Brazilian Amazon Surveillance System 
(SIVAM) that employs planes, radar and satellites to safeguard Brazil's Amazon 
region.126   
 In addition to the statements and actions of individual nations, the recent 
regional response in the context of cooperative measures has also been encouraging.  On 
12 February, 2003, the OAS issued a resolution condemning the FARC bombing of the 
Nogal nightclub in Colombia a week earlier.  In the resolution, the OAS pledged its 
cooperation in "pursuing, capturing, prosecuting, punishing, and when appropriate, 
expediting the extradition of the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the attack" on 
the Bogota nightclub.  Additionally, the OAS resolved to “adopt the necessary measures 
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to intensify information exchange on the activities of terrorist groups, to reinforce border 
controls and to prevent the movement of terrorists and to suppress the funding of such 
groups.”127  On the heels of the OAS resolution, Colombia called for and hosted a 
regional summit of foreign and defense ministers in March of 2003 to discuss joint 
strategies in conducting the war on terrorism and drug trafficking.  Representatives 
attended from Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia and the United States. 
Presumably, one of the goals of the summit was to formulate a regional strategy to 
confront the terrorist problem posed by armed groups in Colombia.  The U.S. Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs attended and stated that he considered it a priority 
to “formulate practical measures” to put into effect the OAS resolution from 
February.128   
It is not yet clear what these practical measures might be.  The final chapter 
examines a number of possible scenarios, ranging from a continuation of the status quo to 
the introduction of a regional military force into Colombia.  It evaluates the political 
feasibility of each option as well as their expected effectiveness in contributing to a 
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Although past history has shown there to be reluctance on the part of Latin 
American nations to cooperate in reaction to the conflict in Colombia, there seems to be 
growing support among Colombia’s neighbors for some form of regional response to the 
crisis.  It is the central argument of this thesis that the crisis in Colombia has reached a 
proportion that now warrants a strong and unified regional reaction in the form of a 
cooperative military effort.   
As shown in Chapter II, the crisis in Colombia not only poses a very real threat to 
the survival of the Colombian state as it is now known, but it also seriously threatens 
security and stability in neighboring countries.  The characteristics of the conflict make it 
likely that the use of military force, above political and economic means, will be the key 
to restoring security and that Colombia should make defeat of the insurgency the first 
objective of any strategy.  Because the guerrilla groups espouse violent overthrow of the 
government and have eschewed all attempts at peaceful resolution of the crisis, they must 
be weakened significantly in order to end the threat they pose and to allow for more 
favorable conditions in which to address the narco-trafficking dilemma.   
In Chapter III, it was argued that while the political will in Colombia has now 
strengthened to the point that the military course of action in seeking a solution to the 
crisis will be more fully supported by all Colombians, Colombia does not possess the 
military capability to achieve a decisive victory in a timely fashion.  Traditional force 
ratios required for insurgencies and the sheer magnitude of restoring control of 
Colombian territory while protecting infrastructure and conducting combat operations 
will continue to overwhelm the Colombian security forces, even with the planned 
increases in force structure.  President Uribe seems to have come to the realization that 
the military will require external assistance if it is to be successful in the conflict and he 
has requested regional support to assist Colombia restore security.    
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While Chapter IV pointed out that history has shown Latin American nations to 
reluctant to participate in collective security efforts outside the context of the Cold War, 
it was argued that the need for a cooperative military response among Colombia’s 
neighbors is more critical at this juncture in the crisis than at any other time and that the 
ground may be ripe for an unprecedented level of regional cooperation in response to the 
crisis in Colombia.  Bilateral cooperation in response to the conflict has certainly 
increased, and rhetoric from leaders in the region supporting a much more intensive 
cooperative effort may be indications of the forging of a foundation for some type of 
multilateral approach.  However, the fact remains that no tangible form of cooperative 
response has materialized.     
This concluding chapter evaluates the possible forms this cooperative response 
might take.  The first section advocates the creation and deployment of a regional 
military force to Colombia as the most effective means of contributing to a resolution of 
the crisis.  The second section addresses the legal framework required to create and 
legitimize a regional military action and examines the precedence for the use of such a 
force.  The third section details the operational challenges facing such a force.  Since the 
roadblocks to a regional peacekeeping force are currently judged too difficult to 
overcome, the final section assesses the political feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternative courses of regional cooperative action.  
A.   NEED FOR A REGIONAL MILITARY FORCE   
This thesis has argued that a regional military response, above economic and 
political measures, will be necessary to defeat the triad of guerrillas, narco-traffickers and 
paramilitaries and restore security within Colombia and the region.  Political negotiation 
with the actors who generate instability has proved ineffective in the past, as evidenced 
by the failure of the approaches attempted by Colombia under President Pastrana.129  
Any attempt by external forces to apply political pressure would likewise be blunted.  
The moral underpinnings of the guerrilla groups, represented by terrorist tactics, 
involvement in narco-trafficking and their lack of popular support, not only dilute the 
willingness of any outside source to engage in such a political effort, but also prevent any 
gains of political leverage should such an effort be attempted.  In much the same way, a 
regional effort to apply economic pressure to coerce the guerrillas to negotiate would be 
ineffective; there is simply no leverage to be gained against the illicit nature of the 
insurgent’s economic support structure, namely coca cultivation and cocaine production.  
While one could argue that eradication of coca would be a form of economic pressure, 
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years of eradication efforts have failed to achieve significant reductions in either acreage 
cultivated in Colombia or in the price or availability of cocaine in the U.S.130  It seems 
unlikely that a regional eradiation effort in an attempt to apply economic leverage would 
fare any differently.  In sum, the dynamics of the conflict predictably negate attempts at 
either political or economic pressure implemented from a regional position; it seems 
unrealistic that either form of response can be expected to convince the guerrillas to 
negotiate seriously at the peace table.  
Operationally, Colombia’s military is faced with the daunting task of not only 
engaging guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitaries wherever they may exist, but also 
controlling territory and protecting infrastructure and civilian populations.  A tremendous 
amount of manpower is necessary to perform this function of territorial control and 
infrastructure protection, and the requirement has detracted considerably from 
Colombia’s efforts to field a substantially larger combat force.  It will be years before 
Colombia has achieved the necessary amount of manpower to maintain control of 
territory and conduct effective combat operations against the insurgency.  It would seem 
then, that should a regional military response evolve, it would be employed in a role that 
would free the Colombian security forces from what is essentially guard duty and allow 
them to focus on the conduct of combat operations, at least until the point that 
belligerents have been convinced to negotiate a peaceful resolution.  While maintaining 
the capability for combat operations, the concept of employment for such a force would 
be defensive in nature, designed to ensure that legitimate, state sponsored control of 
territory is maintained while the Colombian military forces combat the entities in 
opposition to the state.  This thesis will suggest that the most appropriate classification 
for such a force would fall within the definition of a peacemaking mission.  Establishing 
the mission statement of such a cooperative military force in Colombia would be a major 
requirement; it would shaped by mandates set at the regional or international level, as 
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B.   LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRECEDENCE 
Key for the formation of any regional military cooperative effort in Colombia will 
be the establishment of legal precedent to justify any intervention.  Latin American 
countries have tolerated intervention in the past, but typically only under the umbrella of 
legal mandates established either at the international or regional level.  This section will 
attempt to define the legal parameters under which such a force could be created, the 
proper terminology to apply to such a force, and examine relevant examples to determine 
if precedence exists for similar efforts.   
The necessary first step in establishing the parameters for what a regional military 
effort may look like in Colombia is to frame the force’s potential mission within the 
context of international or regional mandate.  To be successful in garnering international 
support for such an effort, any regional military force in Colombia would likely need to 
operate under the legal framework of the United Nations, most likely within the 
parameters of a U.N. Security Council resolution.  The U.N. is currently the only 
international organization with the chartered authority to promote international peace and 
stability,131 and while the U.N. recognizes the vital role that regional organizations can 
play in dispute resolutions (and in fact the U.N. Charter encourages regional 
organizations to be the first layer in resolving regional disputes), Article 54 of the U.N. 
Charter places any such regional organizations under the authority of the Security 
Council with regard to any type of enforcement action.132  So, in order to garner 
international support, any regional military effort in Colombia will likely require a U.N. 
Security Council resolution.  How likely that would be to occur is unclear, and even the 
necessity for such a resolution is debatable, as NATO’s involvement in Kosovo was 
executed without the consent of the Security Council.133   
 It would also be important to define any use of a regional military force in 
accordance with international terminology.  From the international perspective, any use 
                                                 
131 Lieutenant Colonel Victor Tise, “Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping,” Conference Report in  
The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas:  Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century, (Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1998) p. 135 
132 Connie Peck, “The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing and Resolving Conflict,” in 
Turbulent Peace:  The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, (United States Institute of Peace 
Press, Washington D.C., 2001) p. 562 
133 Peck, p. 576 
66 
of military force in Colombia would probably fall under the parameters of a peace 
support operation, a broad category of missions with multiple definitions.  In fact, the 
terminology differences between the United Nations and the United States are actually 
quite significant regarding definitions of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement, and this can lead to confusion among nations and organizations of states.  
While its definitions can be ambiguous, the United Nations is considered the source of 
authority for peace support operations, and among U.N. categorizations of peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and peacemaking, it is the latter that would be most appropriate under 
which to frame any collective military action in Colombia.  As the United Nations 
describes it, a peacemaking operation seeks to halt conflicts that have already broken out, 
and it is, as Dennis J. Quinn states, “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, 
essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of 
the United Nations.”134   
Second, and perhaps more importantly, any regional military action within 
Colombia will have to be framed within regional legal precedence, and for Latin America 
that would be within the parameters of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, known commonly as the Rio Treaty.  The U.S. backed agreement was 
originally designed to fight the spread of communism, and it is the only substantive 
security agreement in the hemisphere.  The heart of the treaty is Article Three, which 
states that “an armed attack by any State against an American state shall be considered an 
attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said 
Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense.”135  As noted in previous chapters, President Uribe 
has recently called for changes to the Rio Treaty that would allow internal armed threats 
to be classified alongside external threats as justification for a collective defensive effort.  
According to Uribe, these proposed changes would be designed to recognize the regional 
threat to security posed by internal conflicts and drug trafficking and subsequently make 
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it easier for neighboring countries to overcome issues of sovereignty and contribute to the 
war in Colombia.136  At a minimum, overcoming long standing issues of sovereignty will 
require placing any such intervention of military force within a regional framework such 
as the Rio Treaty, and achieving that is arguably the most important step in the 
formulation of a multi-national military force in Colombia.   
The scale of regional military effort proposed by this thesis has not occurred 
before in Latin America, yet there are international examples to examine.   The most well 
known examples of peacemaking missions were the NATO interventions in Bosnia and 
Kosovo.  In the summer of 1995 NATO aircraft attacked Bosnian Serb positions in order 
to weaken them militarily and increase their willingness to engage in a peace settlement; 
and in 1999 NATO aircraft and cruise missiles attacked Serbian positions in Serbia and 
Kosovo to coerce Serbia’s leadership into accepting a multi-faceted peace package that 
included cessation of all acts of aggression in Kosovo, withdrawal of the bulk of its 
forces from Kosovo, permitting a NATO peace keeping force to enter into Kosovo, and 
allowing political autonomy in Kosovo itself.137   Another example in which a regional 
military organization took part in a peacemaking mission was the Economic Community 
of West African States Peace Monitoring Group’s (ECOMOG) deployment to Liberia 
and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s.  ECOMOG played a crucial role in restoring peace 
and security to Sierre Leone and in 1998 was commended by the United Nations for its 
efforts, even though it was, as the NATO intervention in Kosovo, employed without 
Security Council Resolution.138  
While there has been little in the way of peacemaking operations within Latin 
America, there have been numerous peacekeeping efforts undertaken that perhaps 
preview the ability for a Latin American multi-national force to operate together to 
ensure security in the region.  Early efforts included the 1948 peace-observer group that 
was set up along the border of Nicaragua and Costa Rica; the group was made up of five 
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inter-American military experts under the control of the OAS’s Committee of 
Information.139  In 1965-1966 the Inter-American Peace Force was deployed in response 
to the crisis in the Dominican Republic.  While an example of a multinational regional 
military force, approximately ninety percent was U.S military and the underlying 
motivations for the force were largely in regards to U.S. interests in the region.140  The 
most relevant example of a peacekeeping force in the Western Hemisphere was ONUCA, 
which was an acronym for “UN Observers in Central America.”  ONUCA was essentially 
a border-observation peacekeeping mission in the late 1980s and early 1990s that was 
created in response to the crisis in Nicaragua and El Salvador; it is more applicable to the 
situation in Colombia primarily because it was a multinational force that had the 
capability to conduct peace enforcement missions.  Venezuela contributed an airborne 
infantry battalion that provided the teeth for prodding the demobilization of the Contras, 
and Argentina provided fast patrol boats and personnel to operate them.  Other Latin 
American countries contributed military participation as well, with observers from 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia.141   
The most recent example for consideration is the Military Observer Mission 
Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP) that was created in 1995 to help keep the peace between Peru 
and Ecuador; there was a high level of cooperation and coordination between and within 
the political and military representatives of the participating countries.  Command 
relationships took some time to be ironed out, but eventually a Brazilian general officer 
was appointed coordinator over ten officer/observers each from Argentina, Chile, and the 
United States, and he exercised operational control over the other nation’s officers.  At 
the same time, the political direction of the mission was exercised via a committee 
consisting of representatives from the Brazilian foreign ministry and the ambassadors of 
Argentina, Chile, and the United States.142  While the situation in Colombia is quite 
different than any mentioned above,  and the military peacemaking solution suggested by 
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this thesis unprecedented in Latin American history, the previous examples do 
demonstrate that larger scale cooperative military efforts are possible in Latin America.  
They may also serve as guides for how such an effort in Colombia might be structured.   
In sum, there are three basic considerations when formulating the possibility for a 
regional military effort in Colombia.  International endorsement of such an effort would 
most likely have to be established via a U.N. Security Council Resolution; the effort 
would have to be defined in internationally accepted and understood terminology; and 
gaining regional support for such an effort would likely entail modifications to the Rio 
Treaty, much as President Uribe has suggested.  More detailed follow on requirements of 
mission, organizational structure, command and control would all be contingent on the 
establishment of some type of mandate from either the U.N. or the O.A.S. and a 
definition of the mission in doctrinal terms.  Section C will determine what those 
requirements and possible roadblocks are to realizing the use of a regional military force 
in Colombia.  
C.  OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS   
While coming to agreement upon the mandates, accords and definitions 
establishing the legal framework for a multi-national military effort is the first challenge 
to overcome in the formulation of a regional military effort in Colombia, the operational 
requirements of such an effort -- its organizational structure, command and control, and 
funding – can also pose insurmountable obstacles to the implementation of a regional 
military response.   
Structural issues regarding the size and composition of such a force should be 
based on two principles related to peace operations.143  First the force must be adequately 
trained, led and equipped.  Any such endeavor in Colombia will need a highly trained, 
cohesive force, well equipped to deal with the belligerents in the conflict.  Leadership 
that is capable of producing these characteristics will be essential.  Second, the force must 
have the means from the outset to establish dominance on the ground; the necessary 
mandate must be in place, rules of engagement must be effective, and command, control, 
communications and intelligence must be capable enough to put pressure on the 
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belligerents.  The requirement for a bureaucracy to properly handle the decision and 
policy processes required for any such collective military intervention is also apparent.  
While the framework for a collective security organization to legitimize a combined 
military response already exists in the OAS, along with the legal precedence for 
intervention in carrying out the protection of democracy, a unified command and control 
system to coordinate military action would still be needed for planning, decision-making 
and communications to direct any multinational military operation.  Currently only the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintains such a bureaucracy.144  As seen in 
Section B above, a critical requirement is for such an architecture to orchestrate what 
would undoubtedly be a complex operation.   
Key to meeting the two principles above would be financial resources.  And while 
the amount of funding required for such a substantial effort is difficult to estimate, there 
are a number of examples that may give a sense of scale to the level of financial 
commitment a peacemaking operation entails.  The ECOMOG case referenced above cost 
approximately $1 billion, spread over several years.145  And while ECOMOG was not a 
U.N. mandated mission, it is helpful to compare its cost to the total U.N. peacekeeping 
expenditures for 2002, which were estimated at $2.63 billion.146  U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) figures are also useful in gaining a perspective on the costs of 
peacekeeping.  In March 1999, DoD estimated that operating a force of 4,000 U.S. 
peacekeepers in Kosovo would cost $1.5 billion to $2 billion a year.147  While there are a 
number of different variables between ECOMOG, Kosovo and Colombia, it seems clear 
that any such effort in Colombia will require a large amount of funding, and the 
uncertainty of the source of financing presents a substantial obstacle to the realization of 
regional peacemaking force.   
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D.   THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO 
The regional military cooperative option presented in this thesis, while arguably 
the quickest, most efficient and effective measure to restore security in Colombia and the 
region, is not likely to occur in the near future due to roadblocks to formulating and 
sustaining such an effort.  While the factors presented in the previous sections – absence 
of a mandate for intervention, uncertainty about funding and absence of an effective 
architectural structure for coordinating such a measure are all significant obstacles, it is 
the lack of political will on the part of Colombia’s neighbors that remains the most 
significant factor preventing a regional military response.  Despite rhetoric that may 
indicate otherwise, Colombia’s neighbors have failed to achieve any substantial 
objectives in the quest for a regional stance towards the crisis.  For its part, Colombia has 
addressed the historical concerns around issues of sovereignty through Uribe’s recent call 
for assistance and request to modify the Rio Treaty.  While such appeals theoretically 
open the gate for nations to participate in such an endeavor, there appears to be 
considerable reluctance on the part of Colombia’s neighbors to enter into such an 
arrangement, despite rhetoric to the contrary.  Colombia may posses the political will to 
solicit cooperation, but in the absence of concrete measures, it is still unclear what level 
of commitment the solicited possess.   
It is far more likely that some other form of regional effort will evolve in response 
to the Colombian crisis; one likely to be much less efficient and timely than the one 
promoted here, but perhaps more politically feasible in the short run.  This section 
evaluates the likelihood and effectiveness of three possible alternative courses of action:  
maintenance of the status quo, increased bilateral cooperation, and regional military 
cooperation outside of Colombia’s borders.   
The first possible course of action is one in which Colombia’s neighbors maintain 
the status quo; they continue bilateral cooperative efforts with Colombia and attempt to 
minimize the threat to national security, or maintain a neutral stance with regards to the 
conflict in the hopes of acting as a mediator in future peace negotiations.  There may also 
be continued rhetoric about the need for regional unity, but without any substantial effort 
made towards that goal.  In this scenario, the conflict would continue on as it has for the 
past several years, with Colombia attempting to defeat the sources of insecurity within its 
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borders and neighboring nations taking the myopic approach of attempting to prevent 
spillover into their own borders.  Bilateral cooperative efforts (or lack thereof) would 
continue in the same cycle seen in the past decade.  For all the reasons brought about in 
this thesis, this is perhaps the most unlikely scenario presented here.  It simply will not be 
possible for nations of the region to maintain the status quo; the myriad of issues and 
problems pushed upon Colombia’s neighbors as a result of the increasing conflict will 
only serve to intensify efforts to explore alternative strategies to deal with the increasing 
border activity that is likely to evolve as Colombia steps up military operations. 
A second possible course of action is one of increased bilateral cooperation and 
increased rhetoric about the need for regional cooperation, yet little in the way of 
substantive effort.  In this scenario, Colombia and its neighbors increase their efforts at 
bilateral cooperation in a sort of “hub and spoke” approach that is less than holistic.  
While increased bilateral efforts might at first be considered a measure of success and 
even as evidence of a more regional stand towards the crisis, the fatal flaw in this 
approach would ultimately become clear:  such a bilateral cooperative effort would tend 
to favor the relatively strong countries such as Brazil, Peru and Venezuela, while the 
weaker countries such as Panama and Ecuador are likely to be increasingly threatened by 
spillover effects.  In sum, it is unlikely that either of the first two scenarios would be 
successful strategies; the spillover effect would likely threaten to overwhelm one or more 
of Colombia’s neighbors as military operations are increased within Colombia.  There 
would be subsequent realization on the part of Colombia’s neighbors that the scope of the 
conflict and the balloon effect that increased Colombian military operations will most 
likely produce will not be effectively solved without some form of regional cooperation.   
In the third scenario, one could expect to see a more substantive option in the 
form of a regional effort to contain the conflict albeit one that operates outside of 
Colombia’s borders.  Such an approach would allow regional measures to contain the 
conflict within Colombia without impinging on Colombia’s sovereignty, most likely in 
the form of regionally instituted intelligence sharing and border control measures that 
allow Colombia and its neighbors to take more coordinated action in addressing the 
issues of the crisis.  Such a cohesive approach might be carried out via a multi-national 
military advisory board made up of personnel from each country in the region.  Based on 
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recognition that there will be a high probability for spillover out of Colombia, and that 
spillover will be more likely to prove a disproportional threat to one or more of 
Colombia’s neighbors, this third course of action is perhaps the most likely scenario of 
the three presented here; a necessary increase in the level of multilateral cooperation 
between Colombia and its neighbors that benefits every nation to some degree, short of 
the formation of a regional military force that operates within Colombia.  Such an effort 
would be politically acceptable, and could conceivably be instituted without substantial 
legal mandate by regional or international organizations.  The command and control 
effort needed for this type of effort would hardly be as complicated as what would be 
needed to control a regional military force operating within Colombia; it is not hard to 
envision a collective of military experts from Colombia and its neighbors that exists to 
coordinate attempts to contain the conflict within Colombia’s borders.  Financing such an 
endeavor would also be much more palatable, as the cost would be considerably lower 
than fielding a military force.       
The effectiveness of such an effort is guesswork at this point; such an option 
combined with stronger bilateral ties might prove successful, but primarily at negating 
the spillover effects propagated by an increase in Colombian military operations.  In 
essence, the third course of action is just a larger dose of the methodology behind the first 
two courses of action; even though it could be pointed to as evidence of concrete regional 
cooperation, it would in reality be another stop gap measure that only addresses the 
symptoms of the problem while doing very little to assist Colombia resolve the real issue 
of restoring legitimate control over its territory.  In contrast, employing an internationally 
or regionally mandated peacemaking force, as suggested by this thesis, would be a much 
more holistic approach that would essentially attempt to address the cause of the 
symptoms.  Such a regional force, while politically and financially riskier than any of the 
courses of action suggested above, is ultimately the most effective strategy for 
Colombia’s neighbors to adopt. 
Whatever the actual regional cooperative strategy turns out to be, this thesis has 
attempted to establish that the situation in Colombia requires, at a minimum, a substantial 
regional cooperative military effort.  And, however likely such an effort may or may not 
be, it would be unprecedented in Latin American history and would perhaps be an 
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excellent opportunity for establishing solidarity among nations of the region, in addition 
to putting some real teeth into the Organization of American States rhetoric regarding the 
necessity of upholding democracy and security in the region.  It may also prove to be the 
beginnings of a new era of cooperative effort that forges a more secure and cohesive 
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